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The half truths of one generation tend at times to perpetuate themselves
in the law as the whole truths of another, when constant repetition brings
it about that qualifications, taken once for granted, are disregarded or
forgotten.'
Negligence doctrine has long distinguished misfeasance (a
"misdoing") from nonfeasance (a "not doing"), purporting to pro-
vide that the former occasions liability and the latter does not.
The distinction's seed was sown in the fifteenth century, a time
at which the courts expressly recognized neither the concepts of
negligence nor "duty" as each is now known to the common law.
During the early fifteenth century, common law courts spoke of
"misfeasance" when a defendant by act or omission had failed to
perform what modern law would label a duty. It invoked "nonfea-
sance" for defendants who, with respect to the controversy at
issue, had, in modern terms, no duty to act or forbear. Hence, if a
court of that era opined that "defendant's conduct was a misfea-
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1. Allegheny College v. National Chautauqua Cty. Bank, 246 N.Y. 369, 373
(1927) (Cardozo, C.J.).
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sance," it meant only that with respect to the plaintiff, the defen-
dant had a duty to act or forbear and failed to honor it. If, on the
other hand, it ruled that "defendant committed a mere nonfea-
sance," it intended to express that in relation to the plaintiffs
injury, the defendant had no duty to act or forbear.'
Those original usages have been lost in a tangle of careless
judicial expression. A profound confusion has replaced them, and
in the realm of negligence, the words nonfeasance and misfea-
sance now wreak conceptual chaos. On one hand, modern negli-
gence law is said to attach liability to imprudent acts or omis-
sions.' On the other, it continues in a mindless, mechanical man-
ner to countenance the statement that nonfeasance, which it
equates with inaction, raises no liability.4
The law (if it has a will) never intended that nonfeasance and
misfeasance should be distinguished, since in logic inaction is one
form of action. Rather, it planned that one should be liable for
the harm he causes by acting in violation of a duty, or by failing
to act when action was his duty. It is unfortunate that negligence
law, when it first arose in the nineteenth century, should have
somehow acquired, adopted, and endorsed the false differentia-
tion between nonfeasance and misfeasance first created four
hundred years earlier. For scholarly review of the historical re-
cords does show rudimentary efforts by some thinkers of the six-
teenth century to abolish the distinction and to regulate conduct
on the basis of duty.
Part I of this article lays the basis for subsequent discussion
by (a) examining the manner in which English courts early de-
fined and distinguished misfeasance and nonfeasance, (b) identi-
fying the single case from which there emerged the erroneous
jurisprudence that produced the law's confused perspective on
the terms, and c) probing the conceptual tensions to which the
terms then gave rise from the fifteenth through the nineteenth
centuries. Building on Part I, Part II describes the manner in
which "nonfeasance" and its supposed contradistinction to "mis-
feas'ance" now muddles the law of negligence. Through historical
inquiry it demonstrates that the confusion reflects, in truth, the
law's failure ever to delimit the notion of duty as it, in turn,
informs the realm of negligence. Part III sets forth a workable
conceptual scheme through which courts might determine that
with respect to negligence, a given defendant does or does not
2. For an historical analysis of the early fifteenth century treatment of non-
feasance, see notes 5-21 and accompanying text.
3. See note 27 and accompanying text.
4. See note 93 and accompanying text.
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owe a duty to a given plaintiff. It thus unburdens the common
law of the befuddlement with which it has so long lived in this
regard and, indeed, frees it to delete "nonfeasance" and "misfea-
sance" from its lexicon.
I. HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF NONFEASANCE AND
MISFEASANCE - THE CONFUSION EMERGES5
Very early common law shows no distinction between misfea-
sance and nonfeasance. Imprudence wrought liability whether
the defendant's behavior pertained to an act or an omission.'
5. Unless otherwise noted, translations of all cases herein cited derive from
J.H. BAKER & S.F.C. MILSOM, SOURCES OF ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY: PRIVATE LAW
TO 1750 (1986).
6. As early as 1247, judgment was rendered against individuals for failure to
act. See Pleas of the Manors of the Abbey of Bec for the Martinmas Term, AD. 1247,
2 SELDEN SOC'VY 9-10 (1888). In Manors of the Abbey of Bec, the record reveals that
liability was imposed on the entire township of Little Ogbourne for failing to wash
the lord's sheep and failing to reap. Id. The record, however, does not reveal
whether a duty existed, either at law or by contract, to perform these acts. Id. Simi-
larly, in 1293, a man was found liable for allowing the lord's pigs to perish
through his negligence in tending to them. See Court of Brightwaltham, A.D. 1293, 2
SELDEN Soc'y 170 (1888). Both cases indicate that under some circumstances thir-
teenth century common law imposed liability for inaction.
In Waldon v. Mareschal, the plaintiff counted that a veterinarian "took in
hand and made himself responsible. [manucepit]" to cure an ill horse. Waldon v.
Mareschal, Y.B. Mich. 43 Edw. III. fo. 33, pl. 38 (1370), translated in A.W.B.
SIMPSON, A HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF CONTRACT: THE RISE OF THE ACTION
OF ASSUMPSIT 212 (1975). "Afterwards, the aforesaid John [the veterinarian] per-
formed his cure so negligently" that the horse died. Waldon, Y.B. Mich. 42 Edw. 11,
fo. 33, pl. 38. The defendant all but acknowledged that he would have been liable
had the action been brought in covenant and if plaintiff had produced the requisite
instrument, signed and sealed, such instrument also being known as a "specialty."
Id.; see note 13 for a discussion of specialties. Yet the suit was sustained despite
the specialty's absence, demonstrating that imprudent omission, in this case, "de-
fault of a cure," wrought liability, much as negligent omission does today. See
Waldon, Y.B. Mich. 42 Edw. III, fo. 33, pl. 38. Fourteenth century common law, of
course, was steeped in formalism and it appears that the Waldon plaintiff succeeded
in part because he included in his pleadings the word manucepere, thus transform-
ing a parole agreement, otherwise unenforceable, into defendant's duty of prudent
action. SIMPSON, at 212.
[Plaintiffs] choice of the word manucepit, with the curious construction that
follows it, is not at all easy to explain. Manucepere is a verb with a very
specific legal meaning in the fourteenth century, developed in connection with
the writ of mainprise (de manucaptione). It must be translated with this in
mind, so that the sense of the passage is probably something like this: "that
the aforesaid John took in hand and made himself responsible for the said
William's horse so far as its illness is concerned, and afterwards the afore-
said John performed his cure so negligently that his horse died." This power-
ful assertion and the peculiar grammatical construction through which it is ex-
pressed is mirrored in the French of the year-book report, and this cannot be
accidental. Thus Kirton says in argument, "Because he has counted that he
ought to have taken responsibility for the horse's malady ... [q. il. av.
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Conceptually the distinction first announced itself in 1400 when
a litigant first attempted to extend the action of trespass on the
case in assumpsit7 to nonperformance of a parole promise where
empris son cheval del malady .... I."
Id.
Also during the mid-fourteenth century, when assumpsit began to make its
mark on trespass on the case, there arose the case of Bukton v. Tounesende, more
commonly known as The Case of the Humber Ferryman. See Bukton v. Tounesende,
22 Lib. Ass., fo. 94, pl. 41 (1348). In Bukton, plaintiff agreed that defendant should
carry his horse across the Humber River. Bukton, 22 Lib. Ass., fo. 94, pl. 41. Over
plaintiff's objections, defendant overloaded his boat causing the horse to drown. Id.
Plaintiff sued defendant in trespass. Id. Defendant objected on the ground that the
case sounded more properly in covenant since it pertained to inaction. Id. He argued
that he could not be liable in covenant, and therefore not at all, because plaintiff
failed to produce a specialty. Id. However, the court found that defendant committed
a trespass by overloading his boat in the face of plaintiffs objections. Id. The deci-
sion indicates that fourteenth century common law imposed liability for imprudent
action.
All four cases just discussed indicate that thirteenth and fourteenth century
common law imposed liability on those who caused damage through carelessness or
imprudence, whether by act or omission. Liability did not depend on the action of
covenant and its attendant specialty, but rather on the law's conception of duty
(although that word does not appear in the reports).
7. The action of trespass on the case in assumpsit is hingepin to the history
of contract. Although the reports are sufficiently vague and incomplete to leave
doubt even on fundamental points, it appears that in the fifteenth century one's
promise was enforceable only if set forth in a writing, signed and sealed, the writing
being known as a "specialty." See SIMPSON, cited at note 6, at 9-13. Breach gave rise
to an action in covenant. Id. The action was not available, however, to one who
claimed breach of an oral promise. Id. Hence the oral promise was per se unenforce-
able. Id.
Nonetheless, during the fifteenth century, it became established that if a
party first made a parole promise, presumably as part of an exchange, and then
began to act on it, he was obliged to perform with care and prudence. See note 26
and accompanying text. Faulty performance would subject him to suit in trespass on
the case in assumpsit - a subspecies of trespass on the case. The beginning of the
performance was the assumpsit or "undertaking" and created a duty of diligence, the
breach of which supported the suit. See, e.g., Anon., Carylls Report, BL MS.
Harley 1624, fo. 28 (1493) ("An action on the case lies only where a thing is done
badly, by an actual act . . .but for not building the house a writ of covenant lies, if
there is a writing, and if not there is no remedy."); Shipton v. Doige, Y.B. Trin. 20
Hen. VI, fo. 34, pl. 4 (1442) [hereinafter Doige's Case] ("If a carpenter undertakes
to make me a house, and does not do it, I shall not have a writ of trespass but
only an action of covenant (if I have a specialty). But if he makes the house, and
does it so badly, I shall have an action of trespass on my case . . . ."). Regarding
the nature of assumpsit see James B. Ames, The History of Assumpsit (1 & 2), 2
HARV. L. REV. 1, 53 (1888) [hereinafter History of Assumpsit]. See SIMPSON, cited at
note 6, at 199-215; 3 THOMAS A. STREET, THE FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL LIABILITY
245-67 (F.B. Rothman ed. 1980) (discussing the nature of trespass on the case and
its origin); see also Morris S. Arnold, Accident, Mistake, and Rules of Liability In
The Fourteenth-Century Law of Torts, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 361 (1979); S.F.C. Milsom,
Trespass From Henry III To Edward III (Part Ii.), 74 L.Q. REV. 561 (1958); S.F.C.
Milsom, Not Doing Is No Trespass, [1954] CAMBRIDGE L.J. 105. Regarding liability
for tortious acts prior to the advent of trespass on the case see Charles 0. Gregory,
Trespass To Negligence To Absolute Liability, 37 VA. L. REV. 359 (1951); S.F.C.
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the resulting loss involved no physical damage.8
In Watton v. Brinth, the plaintiff brought an action of tres-
pass on the case in assumpsit,0 alleging that the defendant,
"[undertook... to construct well and faithfully within a certain
time certain houses of Watton, yet the same Brinth took no care
Milsom, Trespass From Henry III To Edward III (pts 1 & 2), 74 L.Q. REV. 195, 407
(1958); John H. Wigmore, Responsibility For Tortious Acts: Its History, 7 HAav. L.
REV. 315 (1894); Percy H. Winfield & Arthur L. Goodhart, Trespass and Negligence,
49 L.Q. REv. 359 (1933).
8. Before 1400, actions for trespass on the case in assumpsit were brought
only for injury to humans or their animals. SIMPSON, cited at note 6, at 218.
9. Y.B. Mich. 2 Hen. IV, ro. 3v, pl. 9 (1400).
10. "Assumpsit" did not arise as an action unto itself until the mid-sixteenth
century. SIMPSON, cited at note 6, at 273. Before then, the word signified an under-
taking to act in exchange for some payment or performance, which act, if improperly
pursued, gave rise to a suit in trespass on the case for resultant damages to person
or property. THEODORE F.T. PLUCKNETI, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW
638 (5th ed. 1956). The undertaking gave rise to what modem law would term a
duty. See Marshal's Case, Y.B. Hil. 19 Hen. VI, fo. 49, pl. 5 (1441). In Marshal's
Case, the plaintiff brought a writ of trespass on the case against the defendant for
undertaking in London to cure the plaintiffs horse. Marshal's Case, Y.B. Hil. 19
Hen. VI, fo. 49, pl. 5. The medicines, according to the writ, were applied "negligently
and carelessly" resulting in the horse's death. Id. However, the marshal averred that
he had originally undertaken to cure the horse in Oxford and had been successful in
that endeavor. Id. When the horse subsequently fell ill in London, the marshal ap-
plied his medicines "de son bon gre" (meaning either gratuitously or voluntarily). Id.
Discussing this case, Plucknett explained the significance of assumpsit as
hingepinned on which liability turned: "[i]f, however, he [the marshal] undertakes to
cure it, and I on the faith of that undertaking allow him to treat the horse, then
the risk falls upon him and I have suffered a wrong if my horse is the worse for
his treatment." PLUCKNEr, at 638.
Curiously, Plucknett precedes his explanation with the remark: "[ijf I volun-
tarily hand over my horse to the care of a horse-doctor, he treats the animal at my
invitation and therefore at my risk." Id. In relation to both medieval and modern
day liability, that statement appears inaccurate. Whether the risk falls on an indi-
vidual has no relation to that person's "voluntary" act in allowing another to care
for his chattel. Perhaps it was the words of Chief Justice Newton that caused
Plucknett's confusion:
[Suppose] my horse is sick, and I go to a marshal for advice, and he says
that one of his horses had such a disease and he applied certain medicines to
his horse, and will do the like for my horse; and he does so, and then the
horse dies; shall I have an action? I say I shall not.
Marshal's Case, Y.B. Hil. 19 Hen. VI, fo. 49, pl. 5. Plucknett might have taken
Newton's words to mean that by voluntarily delivering the horse to the defendant,
the plaintiff lost any right of action for improper treatment. But Plucknett must
have failed to read carefully the sentence immediately preceding the above-quoted
language: "[n]ow, for what [the defendant] did of his own free will you shall not
have an action." Id. It is clear that Newton referred not to the plaintiffs voluntary
act but to a hypothetical veterinarian's willingness to treat gratuitously. A gratu-
itous undertaking was not the sort of assumpsit that supported an action in trespass
on the case. Taken in its entirety, Newton's statements simply meant that where
one person voluntarily or gratuitously attempts to assist another there is no liability
if the endeavor fails because the person performing the act owes no duty to one who
is gratuitously benefiting from the act. Id,
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to construct the houses of the same Watton in the said time."1'
The defendant proclaimed that the action sounded more properly
in covenant 2 and that the plaintiff failed to present a special-
ty."3 Justice Rikhill explained to the plaintiff that because,
"[y]ou have counted on a covenant, and you have shown nothing
[in proofl of it, take nothing by your writ, but be in the mercy.""'
The same reasoning and result obtained nine years later when
a plaintiff brought an action of trespass on the case in assumpsit
against a carpenter who had allegedly failed to build a house
according to his oral promise. 5 The plaintiff argued that if the
defendant had begun to perform, but built the house inadequate-
11. Watton, Y.B. Mich. 2 Hen. IV, fo. 3v, pl. 9.
12. The action of covenant dates to 1201. 3 STREET, cited at note 7, at 115.
By 1227 the "writ" appeared on the Register. See F.W. Maitland, The History Of The
Register Of Original Writs, 3 HARV. L. REV. 97, 113 (1889). The action of covenant
"[lies to recover damages for the breach of a sealed promise (covenant) to do [or to
refrain from doing] some particular act." 3 STREET, cited at note 7, at 114. The
relief granted by the action of covenant was analogous to that by an action of tres-
pass on the case in assumpsit. Id. The only difference between the actions was that
the former requires production of a specialty, whereas the latter could be maintained
upon a parole agreement, provided that the plaintiff could demonstrate either that
the defendant performed his task negligently or commenced performance and did not
complete it. Id.
13. Watton, Y.B. Mich. 2 Hen. IV, fo. 3v, pl. 9. Although authoritative sources
are shy to provide a definition of a "specialty," all signs clearly indicate that it re-
fers to an instrument executed with ceremony or formality, often including signature,
seal and delivery. A specialty was originally a sealed instrument that served as
evidence of indebtedness. 2 STREET, cited at note 7, at 8. Eventually the sealed
obligation itself served as foundation of any action in debt. Id. at 9. Although a
specialty was once enforceable without a seal, it fell victim to the formalized proce-
dures in place at the end of the reign of Edward I. Id. at 18; cf FREDERICK
POLLOCK & FREDERIC W. MAITLAND, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 218 (2d ed. 1968)
(noting that an action was dismissed for lack of a specialty as early as 1243).
The requirement of a seal probably arose because "Itihere was practically no
judicial machinery for sifting the truth of oral testimony" in order to ascertain the
validity of a parole promise. 2 STREET, cited at note 7, at 18. Additionally, "[there
was no conception as such as the later doctrine of consideration" by which to mea-
sure liability. Id. Over the past three hundred years some have characterized a
specialty as a substitute for consideration. See, e.g., WILLIAM R. ANSON, PRINCIPLES
OF THE ENGLISH LAW OF CONTRACTS 59-60 (4th ed. 1887); LEAKE ON CONTRACTS 76
(1867). Street thinks they are mistaken:
In modem times the notion that something must always be given for a prom-
ise in order to make it binding has become so deeply imbedded in legal con-
sciousness that our judges have sought to bring the specialty contract within
the doctrine [of consideration] by declaring that the seal raises a presumption
of consideration. This fancy has been indulged for more than three hundred
years. But it is as erroneous as it is superfluous.
2 STREET, cited at note 7, at 19; accord WILLIAM L. CLARK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW
OF CONTRACTS 67 (4th ed. 1931) ("It is often said that a seal imports consideration,
but . . . this is incorrect.').
14. Watton, Y.B. Mich. 2 Hen. IV, fo. 3v, pl. 9.
15. Anon., Y.B. Mich. 11 Hen. IV, fo. 33, pl. 60 (1409).
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ly, the suit would lie, and that it surely ought to lie if the defen-
dant failed to build at all. 6 Chief Justice Thirning ac-
knowledged that a defendant who had undertaken a parole prom-
ise would be liable for failing to perform it properly. 7 However,
he distinguished improper performance from total failure to per-
form for "[wihen a man makes a covenant, and will not do any-
thing under this covenant, how shall you have an action against
him without specialty?"" The suit was therefore dismissed since
it appeared to the court "[t]hat this action is taken at common
law for something which is a covenant in itself, of which nothing
is shown, the court hereby awards that you shall take nothing by
your writ, but be in the mercy."1
9
No doubt the courts that decided Watton in 1400 and the anon-
ymous carpenter case of 1409 wished to express their view that a
promise not under seal raised no duty to begin performance but
that it did raise a duty to perform properly and diligently if per-
formance should first begin.2" The courts did not mean to sug-
gest that a failure to act was in all circumstances exculpatory,
but only that an unsealed promise itself raised no duty to act be-
cause it was unenforceable. Although the decisions just discussed
did not feature the word "nonfeasance," they were the bud from




20. This interpretation is supported by the words of Justice Brencheley in
Watton who noted that had the plaintiff alleged that the defendant had begun to
perform and thereafter by "negligence" had done nothing, the judgment would have
been otherwise. Watton, Y.B. Mich. 2 Hen. IV, fo. 3v, pl. 9. The term "negligence"
often appears in pleadings and arguments throughout the fourteenth and fifteenth
centuries. See, e.g., Watkins' Case, Y.B. Hil. 3 Hen. VI, fo. 36, pl. 33 (1425) ("Take
the case where a farrier covenants with me to shoe my horse, and by his negligence
he misdrives a nail into my horse. . . ."); Skyrne v. Butolf, Y.B. Pas. 11 Ric. 11, p.
223, pl. 12 (1388) ("He has said expressly that you . .. so negligently applied the
medicines . . . that he was made worse."); Stratton v. Swanlond, Y.B. Hil. 48 Edw.
III, fo. 6, pl. 11 (1374) (writ alleging that a surgeon undertook to cure plaintiffs
hand and by the surgeon's negligence the plaintiffs hand "was made so much
worse"); see also note 6 for examples of other cases where negligence was averred.
Negligence, during this era, was not recognized as an independent tort. Percy H.
Winfield, The History of Negligence in Torts, 42 L.Q. REV. 184, 184 (1926). Rather,
negligence, as utilized in the context of these early cases, meant the manner in
which an act was performed. Id.
Notions of negligence also surfaced in the anonymous carpenter case. See
Anon., Y.B. Mich. 11 Hen. IV, fo. 33, pl. 60. The court implied that had the carpen-
ter begun performance and then pursued it negligently, an action in assumpsit
would have properly applied. Id. The cases therefore indicate the beginning of per-
formance subjected defendant to a duty to follow through with reasonable care and
prudence.
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which flowered the confusion that now surrounds it.2 '
In 1425, a writ was brought against a mill-maker who under-
took to construct a mill and then failed to perform.22 The plain-
tiff produced no specialty.' Justice Martin dismissed the action
declaring: "[flor there no wrong is supposed by the writ in the
sense of anything having been done (per le fesance d'un chose),
but only the not doing (le noun fesance) of a thing, and that
sounds solely in covenant."' 4 The words were ill-chosen, and tak-
en at face value their message was inaccurate. Fifteenth-century
common law did impose liability for inaction outside the writ of
covenant.' Justice Martin probably meant to say that if an ac-
tion in trespass on the case in assumpsit were based on nonper-
formance of a parole promise, then a mere failure to begin perfor-
mance would be inadequate to support the action. In saying,
however, that the "not doing of a thing" was actionable only in
covenant, he would lead all but the most scrupulous listener to
believe that inaction could not, under any circumstances, create
liability.
The historical record thus strongly suggests that Justice Mar-
tin, a lone judge, with one carelessly worded statement 26 created
the conceptual web, two continents wide, in which "misfeasance"
and "nonfeasance" are now tangled. On the one hand is it written
that negligence may arise from acts or omissions,27 and on the
21. See SIMPSON, cited at note 6, at 220-22.
22. Watkins' Case, Y.B. Hil. 3 Hen. VI, fo. 36, pl. 33 (1425). This case is
also known as Wykes' Case.
23. Watkins', Y.B. Hil. 3 Hen. VI, fo. 36, pl. 33.
24. Id.
25. See note 7 and accompanying text.
26. Justice Cokayne also made his contribution to the mischief, also by confus-
ing the word "nonfeasance" with nonperformance of a parole promise:
Suppose someone covenants to clean out (mounder) certain ditches which are
near my land, and he does not do it, so that through his default the water
which should have run in the ditches floods my land and destroys my corn: I
say that I shall have a good writ of trespass for this nonfeasance. Likewise
here.
Watkins', Y.B. Hil. 3 Hen. VI, fo. 36, pl. 33 (emphasis added).
Justice Cokayne saw no reason to distinguish wrongful action from wrongful
omission and so thought the Watkins' writ should have been sustained. Id. Justice
Babington also agreed and likewise confused "nonfeasance" with "nonperformance":
Suppose someone covenants with me to roof my hall in a certain house, with-
in a certain period, and he does not roof it on time, so that for want of roof-
ing the timber of my house is rotted through by the rain, I say that in this
case I shall have a good writ of trespass sur le matter monstre against the
person who made the covenant [to roofl with me: and in that case . . . I am
damaged by the nonfeasance of the [roof. Likewise here, the plaintiff is dam-
aged by the nonfeasance of the mill.
Id.
27. See Daurizio v. Merchants' Despatch Transp. Co., 274 N.Y.S. 174, 183
Vol. 33:807
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other that liability for negligence arises from misfeasance only; a
nonfeasor commits no wrong.' The Watkins' court responded
not, as it seemed to say, to the absence of action, but to the ab-
sence of duty since the maker of a parole promise had no obliga-
tion to act on it.
Faced with the rule that nonperformance of a parole covenant
was inactionable, disappointed promisees began to plead that the
promise and its subsequent nonperformance amounted to a "de-
ceit."29 The act of deceit became the basis of the action instead
of defendant's nonperformance and for such complaints the
courts awarded relief.3 ° Thus, so long as deceit and disablement
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1934) (Negligence may consist of either "performance of an act in an
improper manner [or] . ..failure to perform an act" or may partake of both.); Kelly
v. Metropolitan Ry. Co., [18951 C.A. 944, 946 ("Omission to do something which the
defendants were bound to do, or an act of commission which they ought not to have
done, may both be acts of negligence."); Blyth v. Birmingham Water Works, 11 Ex.
781 (1856) ('The definition of negligence is the omitting to do something that a
reasonable man would do, or doing something which a reasonable man would not
do."); see also 3 FOWLER V. HARPER, FLEMING JAMES, JR. & OSCAR S. GRAY, THE
LAW OF TORTS 712 (2d ed. 1986) ("[Dlefinitions of negligence include both acts and
omissions."); 65 C.J.S. Negligence § 2(6) (1955) ("It is . . . well settled that action-
able negligence may consist of, or be based on, either omission or commission, or it
may consist of both omission and commission; [mlisfeasance, nonfeasance, or both to-
gether may constitute negligence."); Henry T. Terry, Negligence, 29 HARV. L. REV.
40, 41 (1915) ("Nlegligence is doing what a reasonable and prudent man would not
have done or not doing what such a man would have done.").
28. See note 94 and accompanying text.
29. Most often attorneys were able to circumvent the nonfeasance issue by al-
leging that the defendant had "schem(ed] wickedly to defraud" the plaintiff. See
Somerton v. Colles, Y.B. Pas. 11 Hen. VI, fo. 25, pl. 1 (1433) (the writ), Y.B. Trin.
11 Hen. VI, fo. 55, pl. 26 (1433) (part I of the argument), Y.B. Hil. 11 Hen VI, fo.
18, pl. 10 (1433) (part II of the argument), Y.B. Pas. 11 Hen. VI, fo. 24, pl. 1 (1433)
(part III of the argument) [hereinafter Somerton's Case]; see also Shepton v. Doige,
CP 401725, m. 49 d. (Pas. 1442) (the record), Doige's Case, Y.B. Trin. 20 Hen. VI,
fo. 34, pl. 4 (1442) (plaintiff alleged that the defendant "craftily schem[ed] to de-
fraud' him by enfeoffing land to a third party); Anon., Y.B. 3 Hen. IV, M. fo. 3, pl.
12 (1401), translated in SIMPSON, cited at note 6, at 251-52 (plaintiff alleged that
the defendant had deceived him by allowing a third party to convey lands that
where promised to plaintiff to another).
30. Allegations of deceit to circumvent nonfeasance issues were pleaded as
early as 1401. See Anon., Y.B. 3 Hen. IV, M. fo. 3, pl. 12 (1401), translated in
SIMPSON, cited at note 6, at 251-52. In that case the plaintiff paid the defendant,
who was an agent of the lord of the manor, five shillings so that the defendant
might persuade the lord to grant part of his lands to the plaintiff. Anon., Y.B. 3
Hen. IV, M. fo. 3, pl. 12. The defendant did not perform his promise and the lord
enfeoffed the land to another. Id. Rather than alleging an undertaking by the defen-
dant, plaintiff alleged that the defendant had deceived him by allowing the lord to
convey the land to a third party. Id.
This method of pleading was expanded upon in Somerton's Case. See
Somerton's Case, Y.B. Pas. 11 Hen. VI, fo. 25, pl. 1 (1433) (the writ), Y.B. Trin 11
Hen. VI, fo. 55, pl. 26 (1433) (part I of the argument), Y.B. Hil. Hen. VI, fo. 18, pl.
10 (1433) (part II of the argument), Y.B. Pas. 11 Hen. VI, fo. 24, pl. 1 (1433) (part
III of the argument). In Somerton's Case, plaintiff retained the defendant, an attor-
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of performance were evident, assumpsit could be brought for non-
performance of a parole agreement."
To the careful thinker, allegations of deceit tended to expose as
false the distinction between action and inaction.32 On one hand,
the cases alleging deceit could be construed as pure cases of non-
feasance; plaintiffs complaint simply being nonperformance of a
parole covenant.33 On the other hand, however, these cases
could be classified as misfeasance in that the defendant had
performed an affirmative act which damaged the plaintiff.' Lia-
bility then, was not dependent upon a defendant's action or
inaction, but rather upon whether the defendant owed a duty to
the plaintiff and whether breach of that duty would result in
harm to the plaintiff.
Notwithstanding the rise of actions in deceit, there prevailed
throughout the fifteenth century a statement akin to this: non-
performance of a parole covenant was inactionable as mere non-
feasance; faulty performance, however, was actionable in trespass
on the case in assumpsit as negligent misfeasance.35 Yet, by the
ney, to act as his legal advisor with respect to the lands which the plaintiff intend-
ed to purchase, or, alternatively, to lease. Somerton's Case, Y.B. Pas. 11 Hen. VI, fo.
25, pl. 1. The defendant then "maliciously revealed all (plaintiffs counsel]" to an-
other, became the other's attorney, and procured the property for him. Id. The de-
fendant argued that the proper action was covenant. Somerton's Case, Y.B. Trin. 11
Hen. VI, fo. 55, pl. 26. This argument was rejected since a writ of covenant was
proper where one was retained to perform specific acts, failed to do so, and where a
specialty existed between the parties. Somerton's Case, Y.B. Hil. 11 Hen. VI, fo. 18,
pl. 10. The situation presented was different, however, for not only had the defen-
dant failed to procure the manor for plaintiff, he had become counsel for another, re-
vealed plaintiffs legal affairs, and procured the manor for that third party. Id. By
doing so the defendant had disabled himself from ever performing the act for plain-
tiff and had thereby deceived the plaintiff. As if by magic, the word "disablement"
transformed what otherwise should have been an action in covenant into an action
of trespass on the case for deceit. Id. For a complete analysis of Somerton's Case
see 3 WILLIAM HOLDSwORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 431-34 (1977).
The principles set forth in Somerton's Case were expanded to encompass
the immediate vendor of an item in Doige's Case. See Doige's Case, Y.B. Trin. 20
Hen. VI, fo. 34, pl. 4. In Doige's Case, the defendant agreed to sell her lands to the
plaintiff and the plaintiff paid the purchase price in advance. Shepton, CP 40/725 m.
49 d. The defendant agreed to convey the land to the plaintiff within fourteen days.
See SIMPSON, cited at note 6, at 256. Instead of conveying the land as promised, the
defendant enfeoffed the land to another. Shepton, CP 40/725 m. 49 d. Not unlike the
above mentioned cases, an action in covenant could not be brought since it was
impossible to compel a person to honor an agreement which was no longer capable
of being performed. J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 383
(3d ed. 1990). Thus, the plaintiff counted that the defendant had "[craftily schemled]
to defraud him." Shepton, CP 40/725 m. 49 d. For a thorough discussion of Doige's
Case, see 3 HOLDSWORTH, at 435-39.
31. See generally BAKER, cited at note 30, at 383.
32. SIMPSON, cited at note 6, at 252.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. See Anon., Y.B. 14 Hen. VI, fo. 18v, pl. 58 (1435):
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end of the century, some thinkers, at some level seemed to recog-
nize that action and inaction were ultimately indistinguishable
and that a parole covenant, (if made as part of an exchange),36
I quite agree that the case of the carpenter [who is not liable for his failure
to buildl . . . is [good] law; but if the carpenter covenants to make me a good,
strong house of a particular form, and makes me a weak, bad house of anoth-
er form, I shall have a good action of trespass on my case. Also if a farrier
covenants with me to shoe my horse well and competently, and in shoeing it
he injures it with a nail, I shall have a good action on my case. Again, if a
leech undertakes to cure me of my illnesses and gives me medicines but does
not cure me, I shall have a good action on my case. Also if a man covenants
with me to plough my land at a seasonable time, and he ploughs at an un-
seasonable time, I shall have an action on my case. And the reason in all
these cases is that he has taken upon himself a matter in fact beyond that
which sounds in covenant.
Anon., Y.B. 14 Hen. VI, fo. 18v, pl. 58; see also SIMPSON, cited at note 6, at 234-36.
36. The significance of pleading an exchange or consideration in actions for
trespass on the case in assumpsit is unclear. Whether the case involved nonfeasance
or misfeasance, plaintiffs pleadings normally featured the phrase, "[in return for a
certain sum of money paid to the [defendant] beforehand." See Skyrne v. Butolf, CP
40/509, m. 230 (1388). Alternatively, the pleadings averred that the defendant
"[u]ndertook in return for the said certain amount." See Somerton's Case, Y.B. Pas.
11 Hen. VI, fo. 25, pl. 1. Yet in some cases the plaintiff failed ever to plead pre-
payment or a promise to pay. See, e.g., Stratton v. Swanlond, Y.B. Hil. 48 Edw 1[I,
fo. 6, pl. 11 (1374); Waldon v. Mareschal, Y.B. Mich. 43 Edw. III, fo. 33, pl. 38
(1369); The Case of the Humber Ferryman, 22 Lib. Ass., pl. 41 (1348). Therefore, it
"[clannot [be] assumed] that the averment was essential simply from the fact it was
commonly made." SIMPSON, cited at note 6, at 237.
One might speculate that payment or prepayment had no relevance to cases
wherein the plaintiff alleged misfeasance - faulty performance of a parole covenant.
See R.H. Moch v. Renssalaer Water Co., 159 N.E. 896, 898 (1928) ("It is ancient
learning that one who assumes to act, even though gratuitously, may thereby be-
come subject to the duty of acting carefully, if he acts at all."). There is evidence to
support this assertion. In Powtney v. Walton, the defendant demurred to an action
on the case because "no consideration [was given] for the assumpsit." Powtney v.
Walton, 1 Rolle Abr. f. 10, pl. 1 (1598). The action was allowed despite the lack of
consideration "[flor the defendant's negligence is the cause of action and not the
assumpsit." Powtney, 1 Rolle. Abr. f. 10, pl. 1; see SIMPSON, cited at note 6, at 238
(citing Powtney for the same proposition and cautioning that "Iwle must resist the
temptation to say dogmatically either that this restated what had always been the
case or that the law was changed"); but see JAMES B. AMES, LECTURES IN LEGAL
HISTORY 130 (1913) (contending that even though "[tlhe statement of the assumpsit
of the defendant was for centuries . . . deemed essential in the count, [these types
of actions had] always sounded in tort. [T]he actions were not originally, and are
not to-day, regarded as actions of contract .... [Clonsideration has, accordingly,
never played any part in the declaration.").
More troublesome in this regard are cases in which plaintiffs pled pure
failure to perform. These actions were generally not cognizable in the fifteenth cen-
tury and courts had little occasion to inquire after the importance of consideration,
compensation, or exchange. SIMPSON, cited at note 6, at 238. Watkins' Case however,
does reveal a cursory discussion of the matter. See Watkins' Case, Y.B. Hil. 3 Hen.
VI, fo. 36, pl. 33. Chief Justice Babingtom believed that the writ would be sustain-
able only if it alleged payment. Id. Justice Cokayne was willing to imply compensa-
tion, "for it shall be presumed that he would not have made the mill for nothing."
Id. While neither judge assigned paramount importance to the issue, "[tlhe idea may
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should raise liability for harm caused by pure failure to perform,
just as it did for a performance that was imperfect. Speaking at
Gray's Inn,37 Chief Justice Fyneux said that:
[Ihf one makes a covenant to build me a house by a certain day, and he
does nothing about it, I shall have action on my case on this nonfeasance
as much as if he had been guilty of a misfeasance; for I am damaged by
this: per Fyneux. And he said that it had been thus adjudged' and he
I
have been that, because the action was for nonfeasance, remuneration had some
special relevance." SIMPSON, cited at note 6, at 239 (emphasis added).
Within the fifteenth century, the only other case that bears meaningfully on
the issue of consideration is Anon., Mich. 19 Hen. VI, HIS MS. 156, unfol. (C.P.
1440). In that case, by agreement defendant was to enfeoff plaintiff of certain lands.
Anon., Mich. 19 Hen. VI, HLS MS. 156, unfol. The defendant breached and plaintiff
brought an action in trespass on the case. Id. The court ruled that "[the] bargain
[was] purely a covenant." Id. Justice Ayscough analogized the case to that of the
carpenter who failed to build, averring that if the plaintiff had produced a specialty,
he could maintain an action for the nonfeasance, but in its absence, he was without
remedy. Id.
Justice Ayscough's remarks appear to be the first in which the term "bar-
gain" appears in relation to the action of trespass on the case in assumpsit and it is
unclear what, exactly, it signifies. The word suggests the parties had, as would be
likely, formed an agreement whereby plaintiff would pay and defendant would en-
feoff. The record tells not, however, whether plaintiff had prepaid defendant at the
time of default. It may be that he did, since Thomas Browne, second prothonotary of
the court, said in relation to the case: "[ilf a man pays a sum of money to have a
house made for him, and it is not done, he shall have an action of trespass on his
case because the defendant has [received a] quid pro quo and the plaintiff is dam-
aged." Id.
As suggested by Browne's statement, there seems to have been, in the fif-
teenth century, some school of thought to the effect that a parole promise was en-
forceable through trespass on the case in assumpsit if the aggrieved promisee had,
at the time of the breach, already paid or performed to the promisor's benefit.
The common sense behind Brown's theory was clear - the carpenter who
had benefited ought to perform, and if he had the plaintiffs money in pocket
it was rather foolish to suppose that the plaintiff had suffered no loss through
the nonfeasance. In such a case nonfeasance certainly had caused loss. Reason-
ing of this kind eventually carried the day.
SIMPSON, cited at note 6, at 240. See, e.g., Johnson v. Baker, CP 40/914, m. 104
(1493) (the record); Caryll's Report, BL MS Harley 1624, fo. 28 (1493) (the argu-
ment); Anon., Trin. 27 Hen. VI, Statham Abr., 1624, fo. 28 (1493); Anon., Trin. 27
Hen. VI, Statham Abr., Actions sur le cas, pl. [25] (C.P. 1449) (permitting action of
trespass on the case where plaintiff paid defendant to perform a task which defen-
dant did not perform).
37. Gray's Inn is one of the principal inns of court in London, England. WIL-
LIAM R. DOULTHWAITE, GRAY'S INN (1987). The inns of court "are certain private unin-
corporated associations, in the nature of collegiate houses, located in London, and
invested with the exclusive privilege of calling people to the bar; that is, conferring
the rank or degree of a barrister." BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 789 (6th ed. 1990).
38. While Fyneux stated that this issue had been adjudged, no evidence of
such a case has been uncovered in the King's Bench rolls. J.H. Baker, The Reports
of Sir John Spelman I1, 94 SELDEN Soc'Y 270 (1978) [hereinafter Spelman Re-
ports]. Professor Baker reports that an action against a carpenter in 1499 proceeded
to declaration and imparlance, but adds that this "does not necessarily mean that
the case was judicially before the court." Id.
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held it to be law. And so it is if one bargain with me that I shall have his
land to me and my heirs for £20, and that he will convey the estate to me
if I pay him the £20, that if he will not convey the estate to me according
to the covenant, I shall have an action on my case, and I will not need to
sue out a subpoena.-"
Fyneux was thus suggesting that a suit should lie against one
who, as part of an exchange, issued an oral promise and failed to
act on it.4" He saw sameness, it seems, in faulty action and a
failure of action where action was warranted. Fyneux's state-
ment, therefore, marks an early awareness in the law that the
terms "nonfeasance" and "misfeasance" are of themselves incon-
sequential; that liability attaches to behavior in breach of duty
whether that behavior be stealing, striking, or sitting still.
Orwell v. Mortoft4" further depicts the law's crude but clear
attempt to expose as spurious the distinction between nonfea-
sance and misfeasance and so to abolish the so-called nonfea-
sance doctrine.4 The court seemed to recognize, sub silento, that
liability should attach to the breach of a duty whether the breach
be manifest in action or a failure to act. The facts as alleged were
that the plaintiff brought and paid for the barley of the defen-
dant, the parties agreeing that the defendant would hold the
grain for the plaintiff and deliver it to him on demand.43 When
the demand came, however, the defendant refused to deliver, and
instead converted the grain to his own use." The plaintiff
brought an action in trespass on the case in assumpsit.4 5
Justice Frowicke referred the matter in part to the question of
39. Trin. 14 Hen. VII, Fitz. Abr., Action sur le case, pl. 45 (1499).
40. The significance of this passage is much debated partially because Fyneux
made no express reference to consideration in respect of the carpenter case and it is
unclear, therefore, whether he believed a consideration to be essential to plaintiff's
case. See note 36 and accompanying text; see also SIMPSON, cited at note 6, at 261
("read as a whole, the note ... perhaps envisages payment"); WILLIAM JONES, THE
LAw OF BAILMENTS 37 (1781) ("[Ilt is possible that Fineux might suppose a consider-
ation, though none be mentioned."). Professor Baker notes that:
This report has given some difficulty because no mention is made of prepay-
ment. If Fineux, C.J. really did not think prepayment essential, his views
differed from those of his contemporaries .... In any case, taking the passage
as a whole, together with the statement about not conveying land (where pre-
payment is mentioned), it seems very likely that the report is simply impre-
cise.
Spelman Reports, cited at note 38, at 270.
41. Y.B. Mich. 20 Hen. VII, M. fo. 8, pl. 18 (1505).
42. See SIMPSON, cited at note 6, at 263 ("[The Chief Justice] makes it plain
that he was prepared, if not to abandon the doctrine entirely, at least to counte-
nance very considerable inroads upon it.").
43. Orwell, Y.B. Mich. 20 Hen. VII, M. fo. 8, pl. 18.
44. Id.
45. Id.
Duquesne Law Review Vol. 33:807
deception," noting: (a) (implicitly, if not expressly), that one
party is duty-bound not to deceive another,47 and (b) that a non-
feasance bottomed in deception is therefore actionable. 4" Justice
Kingsmill went further, proclaiming that the word "nonfeasance"
is not of itself lethal to a plaintiffs prayer for relief.49 Instead
he believed that where a duty is breached by nonfeasance or mis-
feasance some action should lie:
And where a general action lies, a special action on the case does not lie,
as where assize of nuisance lies, action on the case lies not. But for a
nonfeasance, action on the case lies, as if an attorney does not execute
his office or a labourer does not do his service in tending my land, for I
am damaged, and no general action lies.'
With Orwell as precedent,5 early sixteenth century common
law spawned a trend toward this position: whenever a defendant
breached a duty, the aggrieved party would have an action.62
Orwell therefore is significant as testimony to the law's tenden-
cy ever to revise its notions of duties and to recognize, slowly but
surely, that liability pertains not to action or inaction, but, once
again, to behavior in breach of duty.
Yet early sixteenth century common law sponsored an alterna-
tive trend as well, apparently born, as earlier noted, of Justice
Martin's unfortunate remark in Watkins' Case."8  Not-
46. The decision also raised the question of whether plaintiff could proceed in
action of debt. Debt was, at the time, the broadest and most rigid of the common
law actions. 3 STREET, cited at note 7, at 127. It was appropriate to the plaintiff
who wished "[tlo recover money or chattels due and made a certain in amount by
contract, by custom, or by record." Id. If the action of debt was to follow from de-
fault on a contract, plaintiff would have to (a) allege that a quid pro quo had
passed to the debtor at the moment the debt arose, or (b) present a specialty. Id. at
127-28. Regarding the history of the action in debt see 3 STREET, cited at note 7, at
127-43.
47. Orwell, Y.B. Mich. 20 Hen. VII, M. fo. 8, pl. 18.
48. Id. Frowicke's discussion referred in part to the disablement doctrine in
Doige's Case. See Doige's Case, Y.B. Trin. 20 Hen. VI, fo. 34, pl. 4 (1442). See also
SIMPSON, cited at note 6, at 257-59. In substance, Frowicke seems to observe that
one who wished to characterize the defendant's actions as an affirmative wrong
might consider that in converting the barley to his own use, he had actively dis-
abled himself from making good his covenant.
49. Orwell, Y.B. Mich. 20 Hen. VII, M. fo. 8, pl. 18.
50. Id.
51. Interestingly, the result in Orwell is unknown. SIMPSON, cited at note 6, at
263. The case is significant, however, for the reported statements of Frowicke and
Kingsmill, as just discussed, and their implications for the judicial recognition that
"nonfeasance" might, in its way, be a form of wrongful action.
52. Professor Simpson writes that some jurists came to recognize that if "there
had been a wrong" a remedy should follow. SIMPSON, cited at note 6, at 264. Most
likely, in using the word "wrong," Professor Simpson himself meant, simply, the
breach of a duty.
53. See Watkins', Y.B. Hil. 3 Hen. VI, fo. 36, pl. 33. See notes 24-27 and ac-
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withstanding the Orwell decision and Fyneux's talk at Gray's
Inn,' a good many sixteenth century jurists continued to speak
of the difference between nonfeasance and misfeasance and its
importance to liability. Subtly and slowly, they lost sight of the
fact that fifteenth century courts first created the semantic differ-
entiation only as a means of ruling that a parole covenant was
unenforceable.5 Instead, they began, through conceptual care-
lessness, to afford the words nonfeasance and misfeasance a
significance of their own. In 1516, at Gray's Inn, the carpenter
who failed to build was once again the centerpiece of hypothetical
discussion:
[Proposition;] a man covenants to build a house and does not, he [to
whom the covenant is made] shall have an action on the case.
Harlak[enden]: and Hales to the contrary: for a man shall not have an
action on the case for not doing something, albeit he shall have an action
on the case for misfeasance. Thus, if he had built the house but not ac-
cording to the covenants, he should have an action on the case; but not
for nonfeasance.
Ting[lenden]: It seems that he shall [not?] have an action on the case.
But he said that he would not take that (maxim) too generally, since if
nonfeasance caused injury to some other thing he should have an action
on the case. Thus, if a man have a house without a roof and he covenants
with a man by parole to tile his house by a certain day, and he does not
do it, he shall have an action on his case; because some other thing
(namely the timber) is injured by this nonfeasance. Likewise, if a man
covenants by parol to look after my sheep and then they drown, I shall
have an action on my case. Likewise if a man is bound by the tenure of
his land to repair a sea-wall and does not do it, so that my land is flood-
ed, I shall have an action on the case. Likewise, if a man is bound to
keep a ditch or a bridge clean and does not do so, I shall have an action
on the case; as a result of this nonfeasance the common way is impaired.
But where the nonfeasance is no injury except to my person, I shall not
have an action on the case.' And, that is the case here: therefore [the
action does not lie].
Dyllon to the contrary: for every law is grounded on reason, and rea-
son wills that if a man has injury he should have an action. Now, he has
injury by this nonfeasance; and so if he shall not have an action on the
case he will be without remedy. So he thought that he should have action
on the case: quod W. Martin concessit.57
companying text.
54. See Trin 14 Hen. VII, Fitz. Abr., Action sur le case, pl. 45 (1499). See
notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
55. See notes 7-25 and accompanying text.
56. It is unclear what Tinglenden meant by this statement for actions of tres-
pass on the case had long been available for personal injury. See notes 6-7. It has
been speculated that Tinglenden was referring to economic loss or mere inconve-
nience. See BAKER & MILSOM, cited at note 5, at 402 n.9.
57. LI MS. Misc. 486(2), fo. 7v (1516), translated in Spelman Reports, cited at
note 38, at 272.
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In reason and logic these jurists were exploring the duties
associated with a parole covenant. Yet they fixed on "misfea-
sance" and "nonfeasance" as though those words were their sub-
ject. If Harlakenden and Hales believed that the carpenter ought
not to be held to his parole promise, they might have said this:
"We continue to believe that one has no duty to honor a parole
covenant." If Tingleden believed that a parole promise was unen-
forceable only to the extent that a failure to perform caused phys-
ical damage to some existing property,"8 he might have said just
that. Instead, however, the debaters expressed themselves by
stating, for example: "[a] man shall not have an action on the
case for not doing something, though he shall have an action on
the case for misfeasance""9 and "[ilf nonfeasance causes injury to
some other thing he should have action on the case."' Insofar
as the law inherits it, the subject of this 1516 colloquium was
thus transformed by "lazy repetition""1 into something entirely
different from that which was truly at issue - a discussion con-
cerning the enforceability of parole promises. The words in which
it was cast, however, fed and fueled, for all posterity, the errone-
ous proposition that nonfeasance is (a) fundamentally different
from misfeasance and (b) necessarily harmless.6 2
By 1533 tension between the two tends brought the following
58. Regarding the relevance of physical and economic damage to trespass on
the case in assumpsit see note 7 and accompanying text.
59. LI MS. Misc. 486(2), fo. 7v (1516) (Harlakenden and Hales), translated in
Spelman Reports, cited at note 38, at 272.
60. Id. (Tinglenden).
61. "lUIncritical use of words bedevils the law. A phrase begins life as a liter-
ary expression; its felicity leads to lazy repetition; and repetition soon establishes it
as a legal formula, undiscriminatingly [sic] used to express different and sometimes
contradictory ideas." Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 318 U.S. 54, 68 (1943)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring).
62. Interestingly, in 1520, Chief Justice Fyneux and his colleagues lost what
would seem to be a good opportunity permanently to lay away notions of nonfea-
sance and misfeasance and so to preclude their reemergence first in the law of as-
sumpsit and then in that of negligence. See Cleymond v. Vyncent, Y.B. Mich. 12
Hen. VIII, fo. 11, pl. 3 (1520). In Cleymond, one Roger Penson sought to buy from
Cleymond six barrels of salted salmon. Cleymond, KB 27/1037, m. 40 (1520).
Cleymond questioned Penson's ability to pay and Penson's father guaranteed the
debt. Id. Penson defaulted, his father died, and Cleymond sued the father's estate.
Id. Cleymond prevailed. Cleymond, Y.B. Mich. 12 Hen. VIII, fo. 11, pl. 3.
Uttering not one word about misfeasance or nonfeasance, Chief Justice
Fyneux acknowledged that the action could not have been maintained against the
father had he been alive since (a) debt did not lie on a parole agreement and (b) an
action of trespass on the case could, under no circumstance, follow from a gratuitous
promise. Id. Nonetheless, the court sustained the action on the grounds that the el-
der Penson's soul might be endangered if the debt were not paid and, interestingly,
that plaintiff had relied on a gratuitous promise to his detriment. Cleymond, Y.B. 12
Hen. VIII, fo. 11, pl. 3.
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results. On one hand, he who failed to perform a parole promise
was liable in trespass on the case in assumpsit as Chief Justice
Fyneux and others thought he should be. Pykering v.
Thurgoode" made that plain and represents the last reported
decision in which a court related the word nonfeasance to tres-
pass on the case in "assumpsit." The plaintiff, a brewer, pur-
chased the defendant's malt, paying half the purchase price ab
initio with the balance due on delivery.' The defendant did not
deliver and the plaintiff therefore bought elsewhere at a higher
price."
The majority of the court thought such allegations made out a
cause of action. 7 As to defendant's argument that his conduct
constituted only a nonfeasance, Justice Spilman said:
It seems that an action on the case lies, for when a man has a tort done
to him, and has sustained damages, he can have an action, but for this
reason: when the defendant broke his promise and assumption, he did a
tort to the plaintiff, and the plaintiff has sustained damages by the fail-
ure to deliver the malt. Therefore the law will give him an action, and no
action lies on this except an action on the case. And therefore the action
lies. And in some books a difference has been taken between nonfeasance
and malfeasance, so that on the one an action of covenant lies, and on
the other an action on the case. This is no distinction in reason, for if a
carpenter for £100 covenants with me to make a house, and does not
make it before the day assigned so that I am deprived of lodgings, I shall
have an action on my case for this nonfeasance just as well as if he made
it badly.-
The passage is significant on two counts. First, it sets forth
more clearly that which lay deep below the surface of earlier
rulings: one who breaches a duty is liable for any harm thus
caused. Second, it indicates the court's awareness that whether
a behavior be characterized as action or inaction, it raises lia-
bility if, and only if, it constitutes a breach of duty. The court
seemed to recognize that "Itihe distinction between misfeasance
and nonfeasance... was altogether too shadowy to be main-
tained." 9
After Pykering, the word nonfeasance no longer served as in-
cantation that would exculpate, for instance, the famed carpenter
63. Spelman, Reports, p. 4, pl. 5 (1532).
64. SIMPSON, cited at note 6, at 269.




69. AMES, cited at note 36, at 142 (discussing the demise of the nonfeasance
doctrine in the sixteenth century).
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who for a consideration promised to build and then failed to even
lift his hammer. He would be bound by his agreement even
though the promisee showed to specialty. In that sense, then,
Pykering put to death the "doctrine" of nonfeasance as it had
previously operated. Yet the word nonfeasance retained an incor-
rigible vitality. By force of habit, many persisted in preserving its
supposed importance to the law and in thinking its contradistinc-
tion to "misfeasance" a jurisprudential necessity. The issues of
nonfeasance and misfeasance lost their place in trespass on the
case, but they did not go homeless.
By 1530 the common law recognized assumpsit as an action
with its own identity." No longer a tagtail to trespass on the
case, assumpsit stood as a suit unto itself and pertained to the
enforcement of agreements.7 Assumpsit was the parent to the
modern contract action. .It gave legal life to the "informal
agreement" - an exchange of promises or performances under-
taken without a sealed writing." As a veritable corollary to the
notions on which assumpsit rested, there developed the doctrine
of consideration providing in essence, that a promise not under
seal was enforceable only if it was made pursuant to an ex-
change.73 Therefore, the gratuitous promise or nudum pactum74
70. SIMPSON, cited at note 6, at 303-07. The conceptualization of assumpsit as
an action in its own right represented not only the severance of its ties to trespass
on the case, but also (a) a history in which "special assumpsit" gave way to "general
assumpsit" and (b) its separation from the action of debt. See 1 E. ALLAN
FARNSWORTH, FARNswoRTH ON CONTRACTS 22 (1990); see generally History of As-
sumpsit (pts 1 & 2), cited at note 7.
71. Indeed, its emergence as an independent action represents, in modem
terms, the severance of tort and contract. It may be said that the severance was fi-
nalized in Slade v. Morely (also known as Slade's Case) wherein it was held that a
plaintiff might recover in assumpsit by alleging a debt arising from an exchange,
without alleging also a subsequent promise to pay. Slade v. Morely, 4 Co. Rep. 92
(1602) Therefore, the plaintiff need not have alleged, specifically, the "wrong" or
"tort" inherent in a broken promise, but rather the breach of an agreement to pay.
Slade, 4 Co. Rep. at 92. See BAKER, cited at note 30, at 392-97; FARNSWORTH, cited
at note 70, at 22; C.H.S. FIFOOT, HISTORY AND SOURCES OF THE COMMON LAW: TORT
AND CONTRACT 358-63 (1949); CHRISTOPHER C. LANGDEL, A SUMMARY OF THE LAW
OF CONTRACTS § 48 (F.B. Rothman ed. 1980); S.F.C. MILSOM, HISTORICAL FOUNDA-
TIONS OF THE COMMON LAW 346-56 (2d ed. 1981); PLUCKNETr, cited at note 10, at
645-53; 1 SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 143 (3d ed.
1957); see also J.H. Baker, New Light on Slade's Case, 29 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 51
(1971); David Ibbetson, Sixteenth Century Contract Law: Slade's Case in Context, 4
OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 295 (1984); H.K. Lficke, Slade's Case and the Origin of the
Common Courts (pts 1-3), 81 L.Q. REV. 422, 539 (1965), 82 L.Q. REV. 81 (1966);
A.W.B. Simpson, The Place of Slade's Case in the History of Contract, 74 L.Q. REV.
381 (1958).
72. SIMPSON, cited at note 6, at 273.
73. Id. at 406-08.
74. The phrase nudum pactum today denotes a gratuitous promise, not ordi-
narily enforceable. See, e.g., Whale Oil Co. v. State, 42 N.Y.S. 208, 211 (1954);
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was unenforceable in assumpsit, as it is now unenforceable in
contract. 5 It was in this last named principle that the word
nonfeasance, ousted from the realm of trespass on the case, tem-
porarily took shelter.
In Elsee v. Gatward,7 the defendant undertook gratuitous-
ly" to refurbish plaintiffs premises, but failed to honor the
promise.78 The court wrote that "[iun this case, the defendant's
Wilmington & W.R. Co. v. Alsbrook, 14 S.E. 652, 658 (N.C. 1892); Virtue' v. Stanley,
151 P. 270, 273 (Wash. 1915). However, it seems once to have referred to a promise
that was simply unenforceable whatever the reason, as for example, the fifteenth
century parole promise on which performance was never begun. See SIMPSON, cited
at note 6, at 272.
The record is not entirely clear on the point, however, for certain language
in John Style's Case, suggests that even in the sixteenth century, some jurists
might have thought "nudum pactum" to import a promise made without consider-
ation:
For instance, if I promise to make you a house by a certain day, and I do not
do so, this is only nudum pactum, on which [you] shall not have an action on
the case; and [you are] not wronged as a result of this nonfeasance. If [you
were] wronged by it, it would be otherwise. For instance, if I am bound in a
bond in £ 100 to pay £20 by such and such a day, and I deliver the £20 to a
stranger and he promises to deliver it [to the obligeel before the day, and he
does not pay it before the day, so that I have forfeited by bond, I shall there
have an action on the case for the nonfeasance; for he has wronged me. The
law is the same if I give certain money to someone to make me a house by a
certain day and he does not make it by the day, there that is a consideration
why I shall have an action on my case for the nonfeasance.
John Style's Case, Yorke's reports, BL MS. Hargrave 388, fo. 215 (c. 1530).
. 75. See FARNSWORTH, cited at note 70, at 22-23; FIFOOT, cited at note 71, at
399; see also BAKER, cited at note 30, at 394; PLUCKNETT, cited at note 10, at 643-
44. The gratuitous promise might, of course, be enforceable according to the doctrine
known as promissory estoppel, designed to make one whole who has reasonably
relied to his detriment on a promise gratuitously given to him. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1981); 1 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 94 (1963); 1
FARNSWORTH, cited at note 70, at 134-47; 1 WILLISTON, cited at note 71, at 609-19;
see also Charles L. Knapp, Reliance in the Revised Restatement: The Proliferation of
Promissory Estoppel, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 52 (1981); Warren A. Seavey, Reliance Upon
Gratuitous Promises Or Other Conduct, 64 HARV. L. REV. 913 (1951); Norman F.
Arterburn, Liability for Breach of Gratuitous Promises, 22 ILL. L. REV. 161 (1927-28);
Warren L. Shattuck, Gratuitous Promises - A New Writ, 35 MICH. L. REV. 908
(1937).
76. 5 Term. Rep. 143 (1793).
77. As read by the court, plaintiffs complaint failed to allege that defen-
dant's promise was made in exchange for consideration and so, in the realm of
legal fiction, it is "fact" that the defendant's promise was gratuitous. In all proba-
bility, of course, the transaction was of the usual commercial type in which plaintiff
was to pay for defendant's services. Indeed, the complaint alleged that plaintiff "re-
tained and employed" the defendant, but the court did not, apparently, consider
these words an allegation of consideration. Elsee, 5 Term. Rep. at 143, 149-50.
78. Id. at 144. The complaint set forth two counts. The first averred that the
defendant did not finish his work and that as a result, "the walls of the premises
were greatly sapped and rotted and the ceilings damaged and spoiled, and the plain-
tiffs . . . were thereby put to additional expense." Id. The matter arose in a day, of
course, when in determining that a complaint did or did not state a cause of action,
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undertaking was merely voluntary, no consideration for it being
stated," and thus concluded that "no action will lie against him
for the nonfeazance."
79
In Thorne v. Deas,8° defendant gratuitously promised to pro-
cure insurance for plaintiff's ship." He failed to fulfill his
promise, the ship was wrecked, and plaintiff sued for the loss
that the insurance would have compensated if the defendant had
kept his word.82 "The chief objection raised to the right of recov-
ery in this case," Chancellor Kent explained, "is the want of con-
sideration for the promise. The offer on the part of the defendant
to cause insurance to be effected was perfectly voluntary."' He
decided then that "one who undertakes to do an act for another
without reward is not answerable for omitting to do the act, and
is only responsible when he attempts to do it and does it amiss.
In other words he is responsible for a misfeasance but not for a
nonfeasance."'
Notably, the court cited the 1400 decision of Watton v.
Brinth" as the "earliest case on the subject."s But Watton was
not precedent on point, and the erroneous reference again de-
scribes the confusion in which nonfeasance and misfeasance are
caught. Thorne and Watton involved different issues: Thorne, the
enforceability of a gratuitous promise, and Watton, the enforce-
courts viewed words with fastidious formalism. In that regard, it is interesting and
perhaps important, that the plaintiffs first count did not allege, precisely, that the
defendant began work, but rather that he did not finish it. Id. As discussed in the
text, the court thought the first count to allege the breach of a gratuitous promise
and hence an inactionable "nonfeasance." Id. at 149-50. It is possible, if not likely,
that the outcome would have been different if the first count had not alleged merely
that defendant failed to finish the work and thus produced damage, but that he had
in fact begun it and produced damage by then failing to finish.
The second count alleged, in substance, that the defendant began perfor-
mance and in the process used materials that put plaintiff to unnecessary expense.
Id. at 144.
79. Id. at 149.
80. 4 Johns. 84 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1809).
81. Thorne, 4 Johns. at 84.
82. Id. at 84-85.
83. Id. at 95.
84. Id. at 96-97.
85. Y.B. Mich. 2 Hen. IV, fo. 3v, pl. 9 (1400). Chancellor Kent referred to the
Watton case as Watson throughout his opinion.
86. Thorne, 4 Johns. at 97. Concerning Watton, Chancellor Kent wrote:
lIlt appears that the defendant promised to repair certain houses of the plain-
tiff and had neglected to do it to his damage. The plaintiff was nonsuited,
because he had shown no covenant; and Brincheley said that if the plaintiff
had counted that the thing had been commenced, and afterwards by negli-
gence nothing done, it had been otherwise. Here the court, at once, took the
distinction between nonfeasance and misfeasance.
Id. at 97-98 (citing Watton, Y.B. Mich. 2 Hen. IV, fo. 3v, pl. 9).
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ability of an agreement not embodied in a sealed writing. In
1400, when Watton was decided, one had no duty to act on his
parole pledge whether or not it was given for a consideration.
Assumpsit had no existence apart from trespass on the case and
the common law did not enforce agreements per se. 7 The Wat-
ton court ruled, in substance, that an action of trespass on the
case in assumpsit did not lie for simple breach of a parole prom-
ise." In 1806, the year of Thorne, assumpsit had lived three
hundred years as an action in its own right and the common law
did, therefore, enforce parole agreements. 9 The issue before
Chancellor Kent concerned the duty imposed, not by a parole
agreement, but by a gratuitous promise. Watton and Thorne
raised issues that were fundamentally different, yet Chancellor
Kent viewed Watton as relevant authority apparently because it
justified him in proclaiming that one is "responsible for a misfea-
sance but not for a nonfeasance."'
In sum, the record reveals that wherever they appeared in
decisions between 1400 and 1800, the words nonfeasance and
misfeasance lacked any true conceptual legitimacy. From the
early fifteenth to the mid-sixteenth centuries, the courts spoke of
"inactionable nonfeasance" when they meant only to say that a
defendant had no duty to perform a parole agreement. They
spoke of misfeasance when they meant only to say that, under
some circumstances, one did have a duty to act toward others
with a certain measure of care and prudence. Yet, in the mid-
sixteenth century, as earlier noted, the common law determined
that one did have a duty to honor a parole agreement. Unwilling
to part with the words to which they had grown attached, the
courts then began to write of "inactionable nonfeasance" when
they intended only to rule that one had no duty to honor a gratu-
itous promise.
The nineteenth century transformed assumpsit into the mod-
ern contract action and trespass on the case into the suit in neg-
ligence. It is in the realm of negligence that "nonfeasance," "mis-
feasance," and the confusion that surround them now make their
home.
87. See note 13 and accompanying text.
88. Watton, Y.B. Mich. 2 Hen. IV, fo. 3v, pl. 9.
89. See notes 70-72 and accompanying text.
90. Thorne, 4 Johns. at 97.
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II. MISFEASANCE AND NONFEASANCE AS THEY INFECT
MODERN NEGLIGENCE LAW
It is written that negligence, as an actionable tort unto itself,
was born in the early nineteenth century (although the word
appeared in decisions of earlier centuries). 1 In modern terms,
one is negligent if he commits a misfeasance, which means that
in view of all surrounding circumstances, he pursues such act or
omission as is inconsistent with the mentality and judgment of a
reasonably prudent person operating under analogous circum-
stances.92 Yet negligence does not of itself occasion liability for
91. As late as 1926, Winfield, in his exposition on the history of negligence,
queried whether negligence was an independent tort or "merely one of the modes in
which it was possible to commit most torts." Winfield, cited at note 20, at 184. In
probing the historical development of negligence, Winfield explored the abridgments
of such legal scholars as Rolle, Shepard, Bacon, Viner and Comyns, noting that a
subject heading for negligence:
Dloes not exist .... But under the title "Actions upon the case," there are
attempts to classify the heap of unsifted matter of which those remedies had
become the nucleus, and there is a misty conception that inadvertent acts and
omissions should form a separate class. The idea barely existed in Rolle
(1668), but it gets less nebulous with his successors, until it appears as "ac-
tion upon the case for negligence" in Comyns (1762).
Id. at 194-95; accord 1 STREET, cited at note 7, at 182 ("No such title is found in
the years books, nor in any of the digests prior to Comyns (1762-67)."). Winfield
concluded that until the end of the nineteenth century:
[T~he history of negligence is a skein of threads, most of which are fairly
distinct, and no matter where we cut the skein we shall get little more than
a bundle of frayed ends. In fact the tale is from beginning to end almost
exclusively a narrative of action upon the case.
Winfield, cited at note 20, at 185; contra 1 STREET, cited at note 7, at 189-90 (con-
tending that until the end of the nineteenth century "the action of trespass was the
exclusive remedy in all cases where damage was directly done in the immediate per-
formance of any act, albeit the injury was to negligence and not intentionally done."
(emphasis added)); Percy H. Winfield, Duty In Tortious Negligence, 34 COLUM. L.
REv. 41, 48 (1934) (Defendant would be liable for harm to a person or his property
in the "ordinary action of trespass . . . whether the harm inflicted were inadvertent
or intentional.").
92. See, e.g., Travelers Indem. Co. v. Titus, 71 Cal. Rptr. 490, 493 (Cal. App.
1968) ("[Olne doing an act which a reasonably prudent person would not do, or
failing to do something which a reasonably prudent person would do, actuated by
those considerations which ordinarily regulate conduct of human affairs, is guilty of
negligence."); Cleveland C.C. & St. Louis R.R. Co. v. Ivins, 12 Ohio Cir. Dec. 570,
570 (1896) ("Whether or not an act or omission is negligent seems to be determined
by what under like circumstances would men of ordinary prudence have done.");
Union Transp. Co. v. Lam, 123 P.2d 660, 662 (Okla. 1942) ("Negligence comprehends
a failure to exercise due care as required by the circumstances of the case; a failure
to do what a person of ordinary prudence would have done under the circumstances
or the doing of what such a person would not have done under the circumstances.");
Loonan Lumber Co. v. Wannamaker, 131 N.W.2d 78, 79 (S.D. 1964) ("Negligence has
been defined as the failure to exercise ... due care .... It is the failure to use
such care as an ordinarily prudent or reasonable person would use under the same
or similar circumstances.).
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the damages it causes. Rather, as to any defendant and plaintiff,
negligence is actionable only if the former owed the latter a duty
not to be negligent.' And notwithstanding the settled notion
that negligence may inhere in an omission, all of American negli-
gence law is subject to the seemingly contrary statement that one
breaches no duty by mere "nonfeasance," even if that nonfeasance
was negligent because one party is under no duty to take action
for the benefit of another."
93. See, e.g., Tapper v. Ager, 599 F.2d 376, 379 (10th Cir. 1979) ("Negligence
does not exist in the abstract, it contemplates a legal duty owing from one party to
another . . . ."); Jacoves v. United Merchandising Corp., 11 Cal. Rptr. 469, 484 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1992) ("To establish liability for negligence, it is a fundamental principle of
tort that there must be a legal duty owed to the person injured . . . ."); Riley v.
Gulf, C. & S.F. Ry. Co., 160 S.W. 595, 597 (Tex. Civ. App. 1913) ("Legal responsi-
bility for negligence does not exist in absence of a duty of care . . . ."); Bottomley v.
Bannister, 12 KB. 458, 476 (1932) ("It is a commonplace of the law of negligence
that before you can establish liability for negligence you must first show that the
law recognizes some duty toward the person who put forth the claim."); Le Lievre v.
Gould, 1 Q.B. 491, 497 (1893) ("The question of liability for negligence cannot arise
at all until it is established that the man who has been negligent owed some duty
to the person who seeks to make him liable for his negligence .... A man is enti-
tled to be as negligent as he pleases toward the whole world if he owes no duty
toward them."); see also 1 C.G. ADDISON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS 19 (4th
ed. 1876) ("But before an action [in negligence] can be maintained, it must of course
be clearly proved that the law imposes upon the defendant the duty with which he
is charged with neglecting."); THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
TORTS 791-92 (2d ed. 1888) ('The first requisite in establishing negligence is to show
the existence of the duty which it is supposed has not been performed."); 1 STREET,
cited at note 7, at 195 n.5 ("The law of negligence historically starts from the idea
of failure in the performance of a determinable provable legal duty.").
Beyond duty and breach, the law requires, of course, causation and damages.
See, e.g., 4 HARPER, JAMES & GRAY, cited at note 27, at 185-86; LEON GREEN, RA-
TIONALE OF PROXIMATE CAUSE (1927); ROBERT E. KEETON, LEGAL CAUSE IN THE LAW
OF TORTS (1963); CHARLES T. McCORMICK, DAMAGES (1935); 1 & 2 JACOB A. STEIN,
STEIN ON PERSONAL INJURY DAMAGES (2d ed. 1991); Charles 0. Gregory, Proximate
Cause in Negligence-A Retreat from Rationalization, 6 U. CHI. L. REV. 36 (1938);
Fleming James, Jr. & Roger Perry, Legal Cause, 60 YALE L.J. 761 (1951); James
Angell McLaughlin, Proximate Cause, 39 HARV. L. REV. 149 (1925); Clarence Morris,
Duty, Negligence and Causation, 101 U. PA. L. REV. 189 (1962); Roscoe Pound, Cau-
sation, 67 YALE L.J. 1 (1957); Jeremiah Smith, Legal Cause in Actions of Tort (pts.
1 & 2), 25 HARv. L. REv. 102, 233 (1911).
94. For example, in Lewis v. Razzberries, a nightclub operator was not liable
for his failure to protect a patron from the harmful acts of a second patron, because
"Itihe terms 'misfeasance' and 'nonfeasance' distinguish between not exercising
reasonable care when acting, regardless of whether a duty to act exists, and not
performing voluntary tasks in all instances, where there is no duty to act. Liability
arises from misfeasance . . . but not from nonfeasance." Lewis v. Razzberries, Inc.,
584 N.E.2d 437, 441 (Hi1. App. 1991). See Wright v. Arcade Sch. Dist., 40 Cal. Rptr
812, 814 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1964) ("One who voluntarily engages in affirmative
action has a duty to use care in performing the assumed task .... [A] failure to act
does not amount to actionable negligence . . . ."); Trum v. Town of Paxton, 109
N.E.2d 116, 118-119 (Mass. 1952) (holding that a highway official who failed to
remove poisonous cuttings from a public road was not liable for death of animals
who ate them because "[a] public officer . . . is not liable for . . . negligence which
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Most often, perhaps, modern tort law associates "nonfeasance"
with one's failure to attempt a rescue, even an "easy rescue" and
so relates the term to the familiar rule, much criticized and ex-
plored, that one citizen has no duty to rescue another whom he
sees in distress.95 Yet, there is no doubt that failures to act do
amounts to nothing more than an omission or nonfeasance . . . .While nonfeasance
is the omission of an act which a person ought to do, misfeasance is the improper
doing of an act which a person might lawfully do"); Doupe v. Genin, 1 Sweeny 25,
32 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1869) ("There is a class of wrongs known as misfeasances, for
which remedies are provided .... The mere omission to do a thing, which a person
is not required to do, would occur no liability."); In re The Liverpool Household
Stores Ass'n, 59 Law. Rep. 616, 617 (1890) ("[A] misfeasance does not include a
nonfeasance, and . . .no complaint can be made . . .of a sin of omission, as distin-
guished from one of commission . . . ."); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
314 (1965) ("The fact that the actor realizes or should realize that action on his part
is necessary for another's aid or protection does not of itself impose upon him a
duty to take such action."); Id. § 314 cmt. c ("The rule stated in this Section is
applicable irrespective of the gravity of danger to which the other is subjected and
the insignificance of the trouble, effort, or expense of giving him aid or protection.
The origin of this rule lay in the early common law distinction between action and
inaction, or 'misfeasance' and 'nonfeasance.' "); R.W.M. DIAS & B.S. MARKESINIS,
THE LAW OF TORTS 51 (1984) ("[T]here is no liability for a failure to act."); John M.
Adler, Relying Upon The Reasonableness of Strangers: Some Observations About The
Current State of Common Law Affirmative Duties To Aid or Protect Others, 1991
WLS. L. REV. 867, 872-73 ("If a court characterizes the defendant's behavior as
nonfeasance .. . the defendant ordinarily will owe no duty to the plaintiff;, the case
may be dismissed.).
95. It is still true, generally, that "no ordinary bystander is under a duty to
attempt the rescue of a child from drowning in what he knows to be shallow water."
PERCY H. WINFIELD, A TEXT-BOOK OF THE LAw OF TORTS 404 (4th ed. 1948). The
adult's failure to rescue is not pardoned for its reasonableness but for want of
duty. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314 (1965); Allen v. Hixson, 36
S.E.2d 810, 810 (Ga. 1990); McFall v. Shimp, 127 PITTSBURGH LEG. J. 14, 14-15
(1978); Yania v. Bigan, 155 A.2d 343, 346 (Pa. 1959); Riley v. Gulf, C. & S.F. Ry.
Co., 160 S.W. 595, 597 (Tex. Civ. App. 1913); Robert L. Hale, Prima Facie Torts,
Combination, and Non-Feasance, 46 COLUM. L. REV. 196 (1946).
The absence in the common law of a generalized duty to rescue is ongoing
fuel for professorial publication. A slew of writers, purporting to be morally outraged
by the common law's callousness in this regard, vent their view that the law
should march to the beat of common decency and so impose on its citizens an obli-
gation of rescue where the potential rescuer might act with minimal risk to herself.
Some such writers show substantial thought. Others, it seems, make only vapid
offerings with their hollowness, hidden in a cover of extravagant phrases like "re-
sponsibility thesis," and "positive duty theorist," augmented usually by a parade of
words ending in "ism." See, e.g., JUDITH THOMSON, ACTS AND OTHER EVENTS 221-17
(1977); Adler, cited at note 94; Alexander W. Rudziski, The Duty To Rescue: A Com-
parative Analysis, in THE GOOD SAMARITAN AND THE LAW 91, 123 (James M.
Ratcliffe ed., 1981); James B. Ames, Law and Morals, 22 HARv. L. REV. 97, 112-13
(1908); Eric Mack, Bad Samaritanism and the Causation of Harm, 9 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 230 (1980); H.D. Minor, Moral Obligation as a Basis of Liability, 9 VA. L. REV.
420 (1923); Wallace M. Rudolph, The Duty To Act:. A Proposed Rule, 44 NEB. L.
REV. 499, 499-503, 509 (1965); J.H. Schield, Affirmative Duty to Act in Emergency
Situations: The Return of the Good Samaritan, 3 J. MARSHALL J. PRAC. & PROC. 1,
13 (1969); Ernest J. Weinrib, The Case for a Duty to Rescue, 90 YALE L.J. 247
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and always have occasioned liability in negligence. Suppose de-
fendant driver, accelerating on a highway at an otherwise appro-
priate rate, sees a child run on to the road and place herself in
his path. He has ample time to brake his vehicle and stop with-
out striking the child but decides, instead, not to lift his foot from
the accelerator and to proceed at unchanged speed and course.
He determines, in other words, to do nothing about the situation
before him, but rather to continue the status quo. Because of his
failure to act - his omission - he is liable for the injuries of the
child he strikes. Similarly, if defendant, backing his truck, "pins"
plaintiff against a wall, the law requires that he act affirmatively
to release the plaintiff by driving the truck forward even if he
had no reason to know of the plaintiffs presence and so was not
negligent in first trapping him.'
That is so, at least, in the modem era.97 There is clearly some
(1980); Robert Justin Lipkin, Comment, Beyond Good Samaritans and Moral Mon-
sters: An Individualistic Justification of the General Legal Duty to Rescue, 31 UCLA
L. REV. 252 (1983).
For better or worse, the law has, in fact, made some movement toward a
duty of rescue. See, e.g., Hutchinson v. Dickie, 162 F.2d 103, 106-07 (6th Cir. 1947);
Farwell v. Keaton, 240 N.W.2d 217, 222 (Mich. 1976); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.05
(West 1988); VT. STAT. ANN., tit. 12, § 519 (1973).
96. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 322 (1965). Section 322 provides:
If the actor knows or has reason to know that by his conduct, whether tor-
tious or innocent, he has caused such bodily harm to another as to make him
helpless and in danger of further harm, the actor is under a duty to exercise
reasonable care to prevent such further harm.
Id. This principle is explained in Illustration 1:
A negligently or innocently runs down B on an unlighted country road. B is
unconscious. A leaves B lying in the middle of the highway, where another car
subsequently runs him over. This is an entirely new harm from which A
should have protected him and for which A is subject to liability to B whether
or not A would have been liable for the original harm.
Id. § 322 cmt. a, illus. 1.
97. It might not have been so in the earlier part of the century. In Turbeville
u. Mobile L. & R. Co., the plaintiffs intestate, through his own negligence, fell in
front of the defendant's streetcar, and through no negligence of the motorman, was
struck by its safety guard which apposed the victim's neck and suffocated him. See
Turbeville v. Mobile L. & R. Co., 127 So. 519, 520 (Ala. 1930) The motorman did
not back off, which act, would have saved the victim. Turbeville, 127 So. at 520-21.
Wrote the court:
While it may be conceded that these circumstances imposed on those
present the duty, from the standpoint of common humanity, to use their best
judgment in doing what they could to relieve the unfortunate victim from his
peril, we know of no principle of municipal law that imposed on the defendant
or its servants a legal duty to relieve him by backing the car off his body or
lifting it up so as to relieve his peril. It certainly could not be said that such
duty rested on a mere bystander who witnessed his misfortune and who was
in no way legally responsible for his predicament. If this be so, what reason
can be found in the law to say that the defendant or its servants were under
duty to act, when they were guilty of no wrong or negligence in producing or
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conceptual tension, then, between the prevailing notions that (1)
negligence and hence "misfeasance" may inhere in acts or omis-
sions, and (2) nonfeasance, though it be negligent, occasions no
liability because one has no duty to act for another's benefit.
"Omission" and "nonfeasance," therefore, must have different
meanings since a defendant might suffer liability for one but not
the other. That curiosity raises this question: What is the differ-
ence between a nonfeasance on the one hand and a negligent
omission on the other? Since nonfeasance, as a concept, now
makes its home within the notion of "duty," the answer should
take account of that word's history as it informs the law of neg-
ligence.
The word duty made no significant appearance on the common
law stage until the end of the eighteenth century. Before that
time, many forms of action provided recovery for injury uninten-
tionally produced "and in some of them there were elements
which, at a much later date and in a somewhat misty fashion,
helped judges to import 'duty' as we now know it into the con-
ceptions of negligence" although those elements "were quite invis-
ible to the lawyers of the earlier period." 8 From the time of
Henry III, he who practiced a "common calling"' was duty-
bound to be careful, attentive, and prudent in his work or be lia-
ble for the consequences. Between the fourteenth and eighteenth
centuries, then, the common law took for granted the notion of
duty. With respect to actions of harm unintentionally produced,
the only manner in which a plaintiff alleged a breach of duty
was, simply, to describe the acts or omissions of which he com-
plained and the form of action in which they sounded.
Somewhere in his mind, and the court's, if it sustained the ac-
tion, there lurked the notion that defendant was under a duty
not to have behaved as the plaintiff claimed he did. That was so
whether the suit concerned the acts of public officials, bailments,
prescriptions, or control of dangerous instrumentalities.
As the eighteenth century gave way to the nineteenth, the
bringing about the unfortunate situation?
Id. at 521.
98. Winfield, cited at note 91, at 44.
99. Although during the time of its legal significance the phrase was difficult
of definition, it probably described those who held themselves out in some public
fashion to perform a public service with specialized property or skill. It included,
certainly, the innkeeper and the common carrier. See Norman F. Arterburn, The
Origin and First Test of Public Callings, 75 U. PA. L. REV. 411 (1927); see also 3
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 165 (1803); OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE
COMMON LAW 183 (1881); MARSHALL S. SHAPO, THE DUTY To ACT 7-60 (1977);
Winfield, cited at note 20, at 185-89.
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word negligence assumed legal significance and began to forge an
action destined to replace trespass on the case.' But the word
made its debut without overt connection to anything called "du-
ty."10 1 Toward the mid-nineteenth century, the word "duty"
sounded its first cries.
In Langridge v. Levy,"°2 "duty" asserted itself, expressly, as
the word on which the decision might turn. The defendant, a
seller of guns, advised plaintiffs father that a particular gun
was "good, safe, and secure.""0 ' The plaintiff discharged the gun
and it exploded, producing an injury that ultimately required
amputation of his hand." Recovery in trespass on the case was
disallowed because: (1) "no duty could result out of a mere pri-
vate contract, the defendant being clothed with no official or
professional character out of which a known duty could
arise;" 5 (2) the injury was too remote; and (3) there was no
privity of contract between the defendant and the minor
child. ' 6 The plaintiff argued that: (1) whenever a duty is violat-
ed, "any one who is injured by the violation of it may have a rem-
edy against the wrongdoer;" 7 (2) the defendant was duty-
bound not to sell such articles as he knew it might produce inju-
ry; and (3) the absence of a contract between the plaintiff and the
defendant was therefore inconsequential.'
The court rejected the plaintiffs arguments pertaining to
duty. ' 9 Yet in the arena of negligence, the case launched the
100. See Winfield, cited at note 91, at 48.
101. See, e.g., Wayte v. Carr, 2 D. & R. 255 (1823) (while it was customary for
a driver of a coach to pass on the off-side, it was not negligent for him to pass on
the near side when the street was broad enough); Wordsworth v. Willan, 5 Esp. 273
(1805) (a person who negligently drove his carriage by not leaving sufficient room in
the road for others to pass would be liable to persons or chattels harmed); Aston v.
Heaven, 2 Esp. 533 (1797) (owners of a coach were not liable to injured passengers
when there was no negligent conduct on the part of the coachman); Scott v.
Shepard, 2 W. Bl. 892 (1773) (Blackstone, J., dissenting) (an action of trespass would
not lie when the harm suffered was "only consequential").
102. 2 M. & W. 519 (1837), affd sub nom. Levy v. Langridge, 4 M. & W.
337, aff'd sub nom. Levi v. Langridge, 1 Horn & H. 325 (1838).
103. Langridge, 2 M. & W. at 519.
104. Id. at 521.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 521-22. The common law doctrine of privity provided "that no one
but the parties to a contract can be bound by it or obtain rights by it." 2 WILLIAM
F. ELLIOT, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1406 (1913). See, e.g., Ex-
change Bank v. Rice, 107 Mass. 37 (1871) ("The general rule is, and always has
been, that a plaintiff, in an -action on a simple contract, must be the person from
whom the consideration of contract actually moved, and that a stranger to the con-
sideration cannot sue on the contract."); see also Vernon V. Palmer, The History of
Privity - The Formative Period (1500.1680), 33 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 3 (1989).
107. Langridge, 2 M. & W. at 530.
108. Id. at 524-25.
109. Id. at 530. The court did, however, find the defendant liable for misrepre-
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notion of duty and many courts of the nineteenth century, speak-
ing of negligence and duty, cited it, rightly or wrongly, as author-
ity.
110
Winterbottom v. Wright"' further advanced the notion of duty
as an ingredient on which a negligence action would depend. By
contract with the Postmaster General, the defendant supplied,
maintained, and repaired mail coaches." 2 The plaintiff, a mail
coachman, was permanently injured through some deficiency in
one of the coaches for which the defendant had responsibility."'
The plaintiff alleged negligent maintenance on the defendant's
part, and so proclaimed a right to recover from him."4 The
court ruled that the defendant's duty to repair the coaches arose
only through his contract with the Postmaster."5 The plaintiff,
who was not a party to the contract, lacked privity and so had no
right of action."'
Langridge and Winterbottom set the stage on which duty, as
an element of a negligence action, first appeared. By the mid-
nineteenth century, they had given rise, generally, to this species
of thought and inquiry:
(i) There was a contract or agreement between A and B whereby A was
bound to do something for B, or was permitted to do something, or was
bound to supply B with something. (ii) C, who was no party to the con-
tract, was injured by A's imperfect, but unintentional misperformance of
his contract or agreement with B, or by abuse of B's license. (iii) C sued
A for the tort of negligence. (iv) A's defence was: "My duty was limited
to my contract or arrangement with B. You, C are a stranger to that
contract: How can I be under a duty to you?" (v) Hence, the courts were
forced to deal with the question, "Was there a duty towards C?" And thus
the consideration of this question became of prime importance and duty
became an essential in negligence." 7
sentation and deceit. Id. at 531-32.
110. See, e.g., Heaven v. Pender, 11 Q.B. 503 (1883) (Brett, M.R.) (fact that
Langridge was decided on the ground of fraudulent misrepresentation "in no way
negatives the -proposition that the action might have been supported on the ground
of negligence and not fraud"); George v. Skivington, L.R. 5 Ex. 1 (1869) ("Substitute
the word 'negligence' for 'fraud' and the analogy between Langridge v. Levy and
this case is complete" and so a duty is imposed on defendant "to use ordinary
care."); Farrant v. Barnes 11 C.B.N.S. 553 (1862) (citing Langridge for the proposi-
tion that when a "defendant, knowing the dangerous character of the article, and
omitting to give notice of it to the plaintiff, so that he might exercise his discretion
as to whether he would take it or not, was guilty of a clear breach of duty").
111. 10 M. & W. 109 (1842).
112. Winterbottom, 10 M. & W. at 109.
113. Id. at 110.
114. Id. at 113.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 114-16. See note 106 and accompanying text.
117. Winfield, cited at note 91, at 55.
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With Langridge and Winterbottom as precedent, courts and
commentators alike began, during the late nineteenth century,
expressly to proclaim that duty represented a threshold issue on
which any negligence suit would depend. 18 The concept's de-
velopment, however, was somewhat "hesitant and sluggish"1 9
but took its place definitely in Heaven v. Pender.2 ° That case, it
is said, first articulated the duty on which a negligence action
rested and so distinguished the action from those which might
attend allegations of trespass, breach of contract, and violation of
statute. 2 ' Lord Esher proclaimed that one's duty generally to
exercise care with respect to others need not rest on statute nor
on the actions of trespass or contract. Rather, he wrote, there
was a "larger proposition," providing that:
[WIhenever one person is by circumstances placed in such a position with
regard to another that every one of ordinary sense who did think would
at once recognise that if he did not use ordinary care and skill in his own
conduct with regard to those circumstances he would cause danger or
injury to the person or property of others, a duty arises to use ordinary
care and skill to avoid such danger.1"
Lord Esher's "larger proposition" made no distinction between
acts, omissions, nonfeasance, or -misfeasance.'23 As of 1883,
therefore, those words had not yet made their way into the negli-
gence doctrine. Lord Esher thought at the outset only this much:
one's duty with respect to negligence was to behave reasonably,
prudently, and attentively in relation to others.124 Others of the
period, however, seem to have sensed that the scope of duty in
negligence ought to be more restricted, and so declined to endorse
118. See, e.g., Degg v. Midland Ry. Co., 1 H. & N. 773, 781-82 (1857) ("There
can be no action [in negligence] except in respect of a duty infringed."); 1 ADDISON,
cited at note 93, at 19.
119. Winfield, cited at note 91, at 57 (citing Heaven v. Pender, 11 Q.B. 503
(1883)).
120. 11 Q.B. 503 (1883).
121. James P. Murphy, Evolution Of The Duty Of Care: Some Thoughts, 30
DEPAUL L. REv. 147, 147 (1980).
122. Heaven, 11 Q.B. at 509. See Fleming James, Jr., Scope of Duty in Negli-
gence Cases, 47 N.W. U. L. REV. 778, 779 (1953) (stating that Esher's passage was
the first to attempt to make "negligence correlative to an antecedent duty to use
care"); Murphy, cited at note 121, at 148 (referring to this passage as "the first
statement of the modern concept of duty in tort law").
123. See Murphy, cited at note 121, at 150 ("Lord Esher's larger proposition
applies with an equal amount of force to both acts and omissions."); but see Francis
H. Bohlen, The Basis Of Affirmative Obligation In The Law Of Torts, 53 AM. L.
REG. 209, 212 (1905) (claiming the passage was limited to affirmative acts only); 3
HARPER, JAMES & GRAY, cited at note 27 at 653 (endorsing Bohlen's contention).
124. Murphy, cited at note 121, at 147.
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Esher's "larger proposition."'25 And a scant ten years after de-
ciding Heaven, Esher himself amended the pronouncement there
put forth and introduced into negligence law the distinction be-
tween nonfeasance and misfeasance: "[ilf one man is near to
another, or is near to the property of another, a duty lies upon
him not to do that which may cause a personal injury to that oth-
er, or may injure his property."2 ' Esher's statement concern-
ing the man who is "near to" another might have inspired Lord
Atkin's so-called "neighbourhood principle,"127  which like
Esher's "larger proposition," made no distinction between acts
and omissions:
The rule that you are to love your neighbour becomes in law; you must
not injure your neighbour, and the lawyer's question: Who is my
neighbour? receives a restricted reply. You must take reasonable care to
avoid acts or omissions which you can reasonably foresee would be likely
to injure your neighbour. Who then, in law is my neighbour? The answer
seems to be persons who are so closely and directly affected by my act
that I ought reasonably to have them in contemplation as being so affect-
ed when I am directing my mind to the acts or omissions which are
called in question."n
In America, the notion of duty as relevant to negligence ma-
tured largely through a line of opinions penned by Justice
Cardozo.'" The first is MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co."' The
125. Id. at 151.
126. Le Lievre v. Gould, 1 Q.B. 491, 497 (1893) (emphasis added).
127. See Donoghue v. Stevenson, [1932] A.C. 562.
128. See Donoghue, A.C. 562, at 580. Interestingly, Lord Atkin thought his
"neighbourhood principle" to embody Lord Esher's "larger proposition," as set forth
in Heaven, and also the "limiting" statement that appears in Le Lievre. See
Donoghue, A.C. 562, at 580 (citing Heaven, 1 Q.B. at 509 and Le Lievre, 11 Q.B. at
497). Lord Atkin thought that in Le Lievre, Esher meant only to limit liability with
respect to the defendant's physical proximity to the plaintiff - "to extend to such
close and direct relations that the act complained of directly affects a person whom
the person alleged to be bound to take care would know would be directly affected
by his careless act." See Donoghue, A.C. 562, at 581. Lord Atkin failed to consider
the possibility that, with the words "not to do" as used in Le Lievre, Esher meant to
attach liability to affirmative acts only and not to that which had been historically
called "nonfeasance."
129. Notions of duty were in some form apprehensible in earlier decisions and
even the word appeared every now and then. See Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N.Y. 397
(1852). Thomas concerned a consumer of a mislabeled product. Thomas, 6 N.Y. at
406. The consumer, of course, had no privity with the manufacturer. Id. at 407. The
manufacturer had carelessly labeled a bottle of belladonna, a poisonous drug, as "ex-
tract of dandelion" which was known as a "mild and harmless medicine." Id. at 398.
Believing it to be dandelion extract, plaintiffs wife ingested the substance and
became seriously ill. Id. Plaintiff brought suit, not against the immediate seller, but
against the manufacturer. id. at 406. The court affirmed a judgment for the plain-
tiff, explaining that the danger of injury was a foreseeable consequence associated
with the mislabeling:
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plaintiff sued an automobile manufacturer for personal injuries
caused by a defective wheel on his car.'' Justice Cardozo re-
jected the conception, announced in Thomas v. Winchester,32
that a general duty of care toward others lay only with respect to
items that were "inherently dangerous," and seems to have un-
derstood that virtually all things of creation import risk depend-
ing on the manner or circumstances in which they are em-
ployed.'33 Therefore, he wrote:
If the nature of the thing is such that it is reasonably certain to place life
and limb in peril when negligently made, it is then a thing of danger....
If to the element of danger there is added knowledge that the thing will
be used by persons other than the purchaser, and used without new
tests, then, irrespective of contract, the manufacturer of this thing of
danger is under a duty to make it carefully."M
Moreover, he opined that "[wie have put aside the notion that the
duty to safeguard life and limb, when the consequence of negli-
gence may be foreseen, grows out of contract and nothing
else." "r Thus, Cardozo took beyond infancy the proposition
that, with respect to all activities, each individual owes a duty of
care to all foreseeable others - regardless of privity, regardless
of contract - and that an individual's failure to honor it sub-
jects him to liability in negligence.
In 1928, Cardozo faced R.H. Moch Inc. v. Rensselaer Water
Co.,"' wherein the defendant had, by contract, agreed to pro-
vide a city with water to serve various needs including the extin-
guishment of fire.'37 While the contract was operative a fire de-
So highly does the law value human life, that it admits of no justification
wherever life has been lost and the carelessness or negligence of one person
has contributed to the death of another. And this rule applies not only where
the death of one is occasioned by the negligent act of another, but where it is
caused by the negligent omission of a duty of that other.
Id. at 409 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). The court opined that the manufac-
turer's duty to the ultimate consumer arose not through any contractual relation-
ship, but rather through its act of placing the poison in the hands of one who would
sell it knowing, then, that someone would likely consume it. Id. at 410. See also
Devlin v. Smith, 89 N.Y. 470 (1882) (holding that a duty to third parties "exists
when [a] defect is such as to render the article in itself imminently dangerous, and
serious injury to any person using it is a natural and probable consequence of its
use").
130. 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916).
131. MacPherson, 111 N.E. at 1051.
132. 6 N.Y. 397 (1852). See note 129 and accompanying text.
133. MacPherson, 111 N.E. at 1053.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. 159 N.E. 896 (N.Y. 1928).
137. Moch, 159 N.E. at 896.
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stroyed the plaintiffs warehouse. ' The plaintiff sued the wa-
ter company alleging that it "omitted and neglected after...
notice [of the fire] to ... furnish" such quantity of water as (a)
was reasonably within its power to supply and (b) would have
prevented all or part of the loss."'
Cardozo found the matter fundamentally different from
MacPherson and ruled that the plaintiff did not make out a cause
of action. 4 ' Here he related the notions of nonfeasance and
misfeasance to the duty surrounding negligence and also under-
took, in his way, to differentiate nonfeasance from actionable
omission.'41 Acknowledging that they did not represent precise
or perfect concepts, Cardozo ruled nonetheless that the words
nonfeasance and misfeasance did have meaning and that they
stood for a principle on which his ruling rested.' Referring im-
plicitly to the fourteenth and fifteenth century decisions, he
wrote that:
It is ancient learning that one who assumes to act, even though
gratuitously,"" may thereby become subject to the duty of acting care-
fully, if he acts at all. The plaintiff would bring its case within the orbit
of that principle. The hand once set to a task may not always be with-
drawn with impunity though liability would fail if it had never been
applied at all. A time-honored formula often phrases the distinction as
one between misfeasance and nonfeasance. Incomplete the formula is,
and so at times misleading. Given a relation involving in its existence a
duty of care irrespective of a contract, a tort may result as well from acts
of omission as of commission in the fulfillment of the duty thus recog-
nized by law. What we need to know is not so much the conduct to be
avoided when the relation and its attendant duty are established as ex-
isting. What we need to know is the conduct that engenders the relation.
It is here that the formula, however incomplete, has its value and signifi-
cance. If conduct has gone forward to such a stage that in action would
commonly result, not negatively merely in withholding a benefit, but
positively or actively in working an injury, there exists a relation out of
which arises a duty to go forward. So the surgeon who operates without
pay is liable, though his negligence is in the omission to sterilize his
instruments ... the engineer, though his fault is in the failure to shut off
steam; the maker of automobiles, at the suit of someone other than the
buyer, though his negligence is merely in inadequate inspection. The
query always is whether the putative wrongdoer has advanced to such a
point as to have launched a force or instrument of harm, or has stopped
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 898.
141. Id.
142. Moch, 159 N.E. at 899.
143. As to whether the proposition applied to gratuitous promises in medieval
times see note 6 and accompanying text.
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where inaction is at most a refusal to become an instrument for good.'"
As a general proposition then, Cardozo would distinguish a
negligent omission'45 from inactionable nonfeasance by refer-
ence to this question: Did the defendant's action go forward to
such a stage that inaction would produce an affirmative injury as
opposed to the denial of a benefit? If the answer is "no," the de-
fendant is an innocent nonfeasor. If it is "yes," then he might be
a negligent misfeasor, depending, of course, on the prudence or
imprudence with which the defendant acted. Cardozo would ex-
plain both Thomas and MacPherson by noting that the defen-
dants had, in each case, "launched" instruments capable of pro-
ducing harm. Once embarking on such an undertaking, their
negligent omissions were actionable. In Moch, he would say, the
defendant had not launched any instrument capable of doing
harm but rather had withheld an instrument which would have
accomplished some good.
Cardozo's view as set forth in Moch governs decisions to the
present day. 46 It seems to provide that no omission is action-
able unless first preceded by something fairly to be called posi-
tive action. He asks whether "conduct" has gone forward to such
a stage that inaction would commonly "produce harm." It is im-
portant that in Cardozo's view, liability for omission rests on
some underlying conduct through which the omission arose and
does therefore depend at bottom on the distinction between ac-
tion and inaction.
Within the judicial arena, it seems that Cardozo more than
others forged a concept of duty generally 4 and in particular
144. Moch, 159 N.E. at 898 (citations omitted).
145. Unfortunately Cardozo does confuse his own explication somewhat by char-
acterizing defendant's conduct at one point as a "mere negligent omission ... at
most the denial of a benefit. It is not the commission of a wrong." Id. at 899 (em-
phasis added).
146. See, e.g., Cracraft v. City of St. Louis Park, 279 N.W.2d 801, 805 (Minn.
1979) (implicitly adopting the rationale of Moch to support the contention that ordi-
nances were created to further a municipality's own interests and thereby created a
duty to the public and not to a particular class of individuals even when death
occurred); Kircher v. City of Jamestown, 543 N.E.2d 443, 445, (N.Y. 1989) (citing
Moch for the principle that "a municipality's duty to provide police protection was
ordinarily owed to the public-at-large and not to a specific person or class" even
when serious bodily harm has occurred); Kornblut v. Chevron Oil Co., 407 N.Y.S.2d
498, 501, 503 (1978), affd, 400 N.E.2d 368 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979) (citing the Moch
principle to deny liability where a man died while changing a flat tire on a hot
summer day after waiting more than two hours for a tow truck to arrive which by
contract with the state had promised assistance to disabled motorists within thirty
minutes of notification).
147. No discussion of Cardozo's contribution to the evolution of duty is com-
plete without reference, at least, to Palsgraf. See Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co.,
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attempted to explain, adequately or not, the seeming paradox
that (1) omission may generate actionable negligence but (2) that
an individual is generally exculpated if his behavior were
characterized as nonfeasance.
As negligence has coursed its one hundred and fifty years it is
not only the courts, but also notable commentators who have
sought somehow to address and resolve the paradox here at is-
sue, by identifying abstract rules or propositions, purporting
rationally to explain the difference between inactionable nonfea-
sance on the one hand and such omissions as constitute action-
able misfeasance on the other. One of the first among them was
Professor Francis Bohlen, who, some ninety years ago, wrote
that:
There is no distinction more deeply rooted in the common law and more
fundamental than that between misfeasance and non-feasance, between
active misconduct working positive injury to others and passive in action,
a failure to take positive steps to benefit others, or to protect them from
harm not created by any wrongful act of the defendant. 4
Bohlen explained that actionable misfeasance differed from
inactionable nonfeasance in (1) "the character of the conduct
complained of' and (2) "the nature of the detriment suffered in
consequence thereof."149 In cases of active misfeasance, Bohlen
162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928). The matter at issue pertained neither to the difference
between nonfeasance and misfeasance nor its relationship to the concept-of action-
able omission. Rather, in Palsgraf, Cardozo sought to define (1) to whom a duty is
owed and (2) if a duty is owed, the scope of that duty. Palsgrof requires that (1)
the plaintiff was in the class of persons who could foreseeably be injured by defen-
dant's conduct and (2) the risk through which plaintiffs damage arose be that
which infected the defendant's conduct with negligence at the onset. Palsgraf, 162
N.E. at 101. Probably the case causes more puzzlement than it should and that
might be due to Cardozo's tendency, throughout his decision, to write in terms of
the defendant's lack of duty to Mrs. Palsgraf, the plaintiff, as a person outside the
class of persons to whom injury was foreseeable, when perhaps he should have ruled
that the injury complained of was not of the sort whose risk initially inflected the
defendant's conduct with negligence. See Thomas A. Cowan, The Riddle of the
Palsgraf Case, 23 MINN. L. REV. 46 (1938); Leon Green, The Palsgraf Case, 30
COLUM L. REV. 789 (1930); William L. Prosser, Palsgraf Revisited, 52 MICH. L. REV.
1 (1953); Warren A. Seavey, Mr. Justice Cardozo And The Law Of Torts, 39 COLUM.
L. REV. 20 (1939), 52 HARV. L. REV. 372 (1939), 48 YALE L.J. 390 (1939); Note,
Loss-Shifting And Quasi-Negligence: A New Interpretation Of The Palsgraf Case, 8 U.
CHI. L. REV. 729 (1941).
148. Francis H. Bohlen, The Moral Duty To Aid Others As A Basis Of Tort
Liability, 56 U. PA. L. REV. 217, 219 (1908); see also LAWRENCE H. ELDRIDGE, MOD-
ERN TORT PROBLEMS 13 (1941) ("There is a fundamental difference, I believe, be-
tween a misfeasance and a nonfeasance .... The man who is guilty of a misfea-
sance makes the other's condition worse than it was before, while the man who is
guilty of a nonfeasance does not worsen the other's condition.").
149. Bohlen, cited at note 148, at 220.
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writes, the defendant intrudes on the plaintiff and "positively"
worsens his condition, leaving him in a state of greater danger
than he would have occupied absent the defendant's behav-
ior."'0 In the case of nonfeasance:
[By failing to interfere in the plaintiffs affairs, the defendant has left
him just as he was before; no better off, it is true, but still in no worse
position; he has failed to benefit him, but he has not caused him any new
injury.... [Nonfeasance creates] a loss only in the sense of an absence of
a plus quantity."
This distinction, Bohlen maintains, "lies at the root of the
marked difference in liability at common law for the consequenc-
es of misfeasance and non-feasance." 2 Bohlen acknowledges
that the difference between nonfeasance and misfeasance poses
more difficulty in practice than in theory and that there exists
conduct "partaking of the nature of both.""3 Nonetheless, he
maintains, "nonfeasance" simply refers to that situation in which
a defendant does no "positive" harm, and "misfeasance" to the
situation in which by "interference" with the plaintiff, the defen-
dant does "positive" harm. In reviewing Bohlen's position, sever-
al others have acknowledged that it poses practical difficulties,
but by and large have endorsed it."4
Bohlen's perspective on misfeasance and nonfeasance seems
palpably inadequate to explain the jurisprudential phenomenon
at issue. It fails to explain Thorne v. Deas,'55 allegedly the first
American case in which the matter arose. The Thorne case in-
volved a loss for which the plaintiff was uninsured.""5 The de-
fendant had promised, without consideration, to procure insur-
ance, but failed to keep his word.'57 The report indicated that
150. Id. ("Mhe defendant, by interfering with plaintiff or his affairs, has
brought a new harm upon him, and created a minus quantity, a positive loss.").
151. Id. at 220-21.
152. Id. at 221.
153. Id. at 220.
154. See, e.g., Adler, cited at note 94, at 872 ("Whatever practical difficulties a
court may encounter in distinguishing nonfeasance from misfeasance, once made, the
distinction is more than academic."); Harold F. McNiece & John V. Thornton, Aftir-
mative Duties In Tort, 58 YALE L.J. 1272, 1272 (1949) ("The line between 'active
misconduct' and 'passive inaction' is not easily drawn."); but see Weinrib, cited at
note 95, at 252 ("For principled use by courts, the unelaborated distinction between
active and passive conduct is inadequate.").
Justice Cardozo, it seems, implicitly endorsed Bohlen's view in Moch. See
H.R. Moch v. Rensselaer Water Co., 159 N.E. 896 (1928). For a discussion of Mach
see notes 136-45 and accompanying text.
155. 4 Johns. 84 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1809).
156. Thorne, 4 Johns. at 84.
157. Id.
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the plaintiff would have procured insurance on his own absent
the defendant's promise."8 Therefore, the defendant did sub-
ject the plaintiff to a "positive" loss; the plaintiffs position was
genuinely worsened by the defendant's inaction. If the defendant
had not made his promise, the plaintiff would have had his in-
surance and the loss would have been compensated. Yet, the
court ruled that the case involved only inactionable nonfea-
sance;'59 Bohlen's formulation does not explain the result.
Apply Bohlen's perspective to the trucker who reverses his
vehicle and, without fault, pins a person against a garage wall.
Any "intrusion" on the plaintiff was innocent and if it caused
plaintiffs immediate death, defendant would not be liable. If,
however, the plaintiff does not die, the law requires defendant to
drive forward and release him. How, though, does that require-
ment square with Bohlen's view? If the defendant were to leave
plaintiff in his precarious position he would not then be intruding
on him and, it seems, he would fail to produce any "positive
harm." Rather, defendant leaves the plaintiff in a position that
he did not in any way wrongfully create. Bohlen's formulation
would exculpate him, but the law would not - and Bohlen would
likely agree that it should not.
Apply Bohlen's view to the driver who does not brake, and
imagine, also, that a third party witnesses the scene from a rock-
ing chair on her front porch. Although she has the opportunity to
rescue the child with minimal risk to herself, she takes no action.
As defendant continues in the course of travel, the witness con-
tinues in her course of rocking.
It is beyond question that the driver commits actionable negli-
gence if he strikes the child and that he is liable for the resulting
injuries. It is also beyond question that the third party witness
who watches from her porch is liable for nothing."6 Is it not ra-
tional, however, to characterize both driver and witness as inno-
cent nonfeasors? Each pursues lawful behavior before the child
appears. After the child appears, they continue to behave precise-
ly as they had; neither takes any action, but instead commits an
omission. The driver omits to save the child by braking the vehi-
cle he lawfully operates and the witness omits to save the child
by rising from the chair in which she lawfully rocks. Is it not also
rational to posit that neither the driver nor the witness has "in-
truded" on the child for the very reason that each has continued
158. Id.
159. Id. at 96-97.
160. Except where the most modem inroads require otherwise. See, e.g., MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 604A.01 (West Supp. 1995); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 519 (1973).
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in a course of action begun before the child, by his own design,
arrived on the scene? Many might note, in quick response, that
the driver is "doing" something - driving a car - and that in
omitting to brake, he fails to do it in a way that affords reason-
able protection to the child.16 Yet, such a response does not an-
swer to Bohlen's criteria associating misfeasance with an intru-
sion on the plaintiff or his affairs.
In 1949, Professors McNiece and Thornton suggested, implicit-
ly, if not expressly, that Bohlen's formulation does not stand up
to the case of the driver who fails to brake.6 2 They did this by
proclaiming that the case represented a matter entirely apart
from misfeasance or nonfeasance and that only "superficial" ana-
lysts would disagree.' The driver's behavior, they wrote, con-
stituted a "pseudo-nonfeasance":
Superficial analysis may suggest that this is a nonfeasance - that is,
that the plaintiff is complaining of the defendant's omission to ... apply
the brakes. In truth, however, the plaintiff is complaining of nothing of
the sort. The gravamen of his cause of action is the anti-social act of the
defendant in propelling the vehicle forward so as to run the plaintiff
down. '"
If there are superficial analysts at work on this matter their
names might be McNiece and Thornton. It is all too easy to hope
that on the strength of so professorial a construction as "anti-
social act," readers will dismiss from their minds the driver who
fails to brake and the puzzle he poses with respect to nonfea-
sance. The common law knows of no cause of action whose "gra-
vamen" rests on an "anti-social act" and the authors have, there-
fore, failed to explain the driver's liability.
Perhaps by introducing the phrase "anti-social," McNiece and
Thornton assumed that the hypothetical driver intended to strike
the child. Maybe they suggested, somehow, that the "gravamen"
of the resulting suit rested on battery, and not negligence. Imag-
ine, though, that the defendant omits to brake, not because he
wishes to strike, the child, but because he genuinely (and most
unreasonably) believes that the child will likely remove himself
from the vehicle's path, or that the vehicle's impact will not
injure the child, or that the vehicle will, on its own, fly over the
child. Surely McNiece and Thornton would hold the driver liable
161. Furthermore, it might be noted that the witness also is "doing" something.
She is living. Specifically, she is passing an afternoon, and failing to pass it in a
way that affords reasonable protection to the child.
162. See McNiece & Thornton, cited at note 154, at 1272-73.
163. Id. at 1272.
164. Id.
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if he omitted to brake on the strength of any such belief. But if
the belief is honest, how would they label his behavior "anti-so-
cial," except by characterizing all negligent omissions as "anti-
social," in which case they draw a full and empty circle in which
there remains the unanswered question: Which "anti-social"
omissions are actionable, and which are not?
Others, too, have addressed the problem of nonfeasance and
omission, among them advocates of something called the "respon-
sibility thesis."' The responsibility thesis provides that the ab-
sence of liability for so-called nonfeasance in fact relates to cau-
sation. John Casey, for example, writes that, "[i]f a man does not
do X, we cannot properly say that his not doing X is the cause of
some result Y unless, in the normal course of events, he could
have been expected to do X." 6' This statement seems short on
scholarship. In recognizing that a man's failure to do X would be
the cause of Y if "in the normal course of events others would
expect him to do it," knowingly or not, Casey reveals that the
question he explores pertains to duty, which for unexplained
reasons, he prefers to rename "cause." The responsibility thesis
contributes nothing to an inquiry after negligence law's appar-
ent inconsistency: that liability may attach to omission, but not
to "nonfeasance." Rather, it comes from those who think new
labels make new ideas.
6 7
Another writer has suggested that negligence law might do
away entirely with the distinction between misfeasance and non-
feasance and provide, simply, that all acts or omissions raise
liability if they fall below the standard applicable to a reasonably
prudent person - except where liability would contravene sound
165. See John Casey, Actions and Consequences, in MORALITY AND MORAL REA-
SONING 180 (Casey ed., 1971); see also ERIC D'ARCY, HUMAN ACTS (1963); ROBERT
NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA 191-92 (1974); Richard A. Epstein, A Theory of
Strict Liability, 2 J. LEG. STUD. 151 (1973).
166. Casey, cited at note 165, at 180.
167. It produces some veritable perversions of reason. Those who mistake the
absence of duty for the absence of causation, have spawned the most peculiar of
statements from those who have read and accredited their writings. One Robert
Justin Lipkin, for example, argues for a common law duty to perform an "easy res-
cue." See Lipkin, cited at note 95. He describes cases wherein rescue is required
pursuant to a special relationship. Id. at 269. He also describes and fails to
disaccredit the "responsibility thesis." Id. at 267-68. Instead, therefore, of proceeding
with his argument on the basis of duty, Lipkin argues that liability should attach to
failure to rescue even though there be no causal link between the defendant's be-
havior and the plaintiffs harm - "the problem of causation fails as an argument
against the general duty of easy rescue for this reason: if causation is not required
for liability in the area of special relationships, why should it be required in cases
involving strangers?" Id. at 268-69.
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public "policy."' For example, Adler notes:
Society should require reasonable efforts to aid or protect others absent
overriding competing societal interests. Courts should allow juries to
consider the reasonableness of injury-causing behavior (even if the be-
havior could be characterized as nonfeasance) as long as there is no poli-
cy concern that outweighs the goals promoted by a finding of liability."
The proposal's essence, then, is housed within the meaning of
"policy," but the author declines expressly to define or delimit the
concept as it operates in relation to his thesis. 7 ' In sum, it
would seem that the proposal offers nothing save a suggestion,
that the law (1) eliminate the distinction between nonfeasance
and misfeasance, and (2) find something better with which to
replace it. What that better thing might be the author does not
suggest.'
168. Adler, cited at note 94, at 901.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 903-04 ("It is not the purpose of this Article to prescribe a particu-
lar list of [policy] factors to be adopted by all jurisdictions, but rather to encourage
the adoption of an approach that may be adapted by courts working within the
established framework of the court's common law traditions.").
171. The author does refer with approval to Schuster v. Altenberg, from which,
it appears, his proposal largely arises. See, Adler, cited at note 94, at 902-03. (citing
Schuster v. Altenberg, 424 N.W.2d 159 (Wis. 1988)). In Schuster, the plaintiff was
injured because of her mother's psychosis. Schuster, 424 N.W.2d at 160. She sued
her mother's psychiatrist for failure to issue a warning regarding the nature and
danger of the psychosis. Id. at 161. Concerning the psychiatrist's duty to warn, the
court opined:
[WMe need not engage in analytical gymnastics to arrive at our result by first
noting that at common law, a person owes no duty to control the conduct of
another person or warn of such conduct, and then finding exception to that
general rule where the defendant stands in a special relationship to either the
person whose conduct needs to be controlled or in a relationship to the fore-
seeable victim of the conduct.
Id. at 165 n. 3.
Rather, the court decided that a duty of ordinary care was imposed on the
defendant unless "public policy" should dictate otherwise. Id. at 166-67. The court
offered this list of public -policy considerations or 'factors" that would militate
against liability:
(1) the injury is too remote from the negligence; or
(2) the injury is too wholly out of proportion to the culpability of the negligent
tort-feasor; or
(3) in retrospect it appears too highly extraordinary that the negligence should
have brought about the harm; or
(4) allowance of recovery would place too unreasonable a burden on the negli-
gent tort-feasor; or
(5) allowance of recovery would be too likely to open the way for fraudulent
claims; or
(6) allowance of recovery would enter a field that has no sensible or just
stopping point.
Id. at 167.
Adler seems heartily to approve of this list of 'factors," although he notes
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The American Law Institute (the "ALI"), like all authorities,
avers that negligence may inhere not only in action, but in an
omission to commit an act to which one is duty-bound."' It also
sets forth the countervailing principle that one generally has no
duty to act on behalf of another, even where as a reasonable
person, he sees the opportunity to prevent harm at negligible cost
to himself. The ALI notes that this rule represents the classic
distinction between nonfeasance and misfeasance:
A sees B, a blind man, about to step into the street in front of an ap-
proaching automobile. A could prevent B from doing so by a word or
touch without delaying his own progress. A does not do so, and B is run
over and hurt. A is under no duty to prevent B from stepping into the
street, and is not liable to B.'73
Finally, the Restatement sets up a series of exceptions to the
general rule just cited and so, without identifying any commonal-
ity among them, identifies a variety of situations in which one is
obliged to act affirmatively on behalf of another. Notably, one
does have an affirmative duty to act affirmatively if:
that he would welcome lists of a wide variety. See Adler, cited at note 94, at 903-
05. It is noteworthy that the list's first and third items are nothing new; they
pertain to long-standing principles in negligence law. The first bears on proximate
cause and "remoteness," two issues much debated throughout the history of negli-
gence. See, e.g., Francis H. Bohlen, The Probable or the Natural Consequence as the
Test of Liability in Negligence, 49 U. PA. L. REV. 79, 149 (1901); R.W.M. Dias, The
Duty Problem in Negligence, 13 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 198 (1955); A.L. Goodhart, Liability
and Compensation, 76 L.Q. REV. 567 (1960); GREEN, cited at note 93; Gregory, cited
at note 93; James & Perry, cited at note 93; Pound, cited at note 93; Glanville Wil-
liams, The Risk Principle, 77 L.Q. REV. 179 (1961); J.F. Wilson & C.J. Slade, A Re-
examination of Remoteness, 15 MOD. L. REV. 458 (1952).
The second item is unclear of meaning. It might abolish the famed thin skull
rule. See Smith v. Leech Brain & Co., 2 Q.B. 405 (1962); Seavey, cited at note 147,
at 32-33. In the alternative it would reiterate the proposition that a defendant be
held liable in negligence only if his misbehavior is a cause-in-fact of plaintiff's loss.
The fourth item is utterly devoid of specificity and might, for its breadth, replace all
of tort law. The fifth and sixth raise issues not only of theory but of practice and
administration and in relation to a theoretical proposition merit only parenthetical
mention.
172. The Restatement (Second) of Torts provides that:
Negligent conduct may be either:
(a) an act which the actor as a reasonable man should recognize as involving
an unreasonable risk of causing an invasion of an interest of another, or
(b) a failure to do an act which is necessary for the protection or assistance of
another and which the actor is under a duty to do.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 284 (1965).
173. Id. § 314 cmt. c, illus. 1 ("The fact that the actor realizes or should real-
ize that action on his part is necessary for another's aid or protection does not of
itself impose upon him a duty to take such action."). Comment c explains that "[tlhe
rule stated in this Section is applicable irrespective of the gravity of the danger to
which the other is subjected and the insignificance of the trouble, effort, or expense
of giving him aid or protection." Id. § 314 cmt. c.
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[Tihe peril in which the actor knows that the other is placed is ... due
to ... [a] force which is under the actor's control.... [His failure to
control it is treated as though he were actively directing it and not as a
breach of duty to take affirmative steps to prevent its continuance.
7 '
With this particular exception, the ALI would account for the
liability of the driver who omits to brake and the innocence of the
witness who watches from the porch. 7 ' Yet the ALI omits to
explain (a) why the law should treat inaction as action simply
because injury results from "a force . . . within the actor's con-
trol" and (b) what, in any event, the cited phrase means. The
American Law Institute describes a plaintiff who falls in the path
of defendant's slowly moving train. If defendant's railway
yardworker knows of plaintiffs peril, then, according to the ALI,
he is bound to take action to stop the train. An unrelated by-
stander, however, would have no such duty, apparently because
the train is within the control of the one and not the other.'76
In the nature of things, does not the bystander have some control
over the train? She can signal the yardworker, who, in turn can
signal the engineer, who, in turn, might brake the train. Indeed,
she might signal the engineer just as the yardworker might do.
The ALI's exception pertaining to "a force ... within the actor's
control" is not the unambiguous formulation its creators might
have imagined it to be and fails adequately to explain the very
scenario the ALI sets up as an illustration.177
174. Id. § 314 cmt. d.
175. The ALI illustrates this principle thus:
A, a trespasser in a freight yard of the B Railroad Company, falls in the path
of a slowly moving train. The conductor of the train sees A, and by signaling
the engineer could readily stop the train in time to prevent its running over
A, but does not do so. While a bystander would not be liable to A for refusing
to give such a signal, the B Railroad is subject to liability for permitting the
train to continue in motion with the knowledge of A's peril.
Id. § 314 cmt. d, illus. 3.
176. Id. § 314 cmt. d.
177. The Restatement further provides that a variety of "special relationships"
occasion a duty of affirmative action. Id. § 314A. The common carrier is obliged to
act on behalf of an injured or endangered passenger. Id. The innkeeper has a like
obligation toward his guests. Id. The owner of land has an analogous duty toward
those who enter at his invitation. Id. One, who by legal obligation or voluntary
action, undertakes to care for another, has a corresponding responsibility toward the
person for whom he cares. Id. The employer is similarly bound to his employee. Id.
§ 314B.
ALl expressly acknowledges that the "special relationships" it identifies stand
as isolated exceptions to the general rule regarding nonfeasance and, further, de-
clares that the list might not be exhaustive - that other "special relationships"
might impose duties of affirmative action as well. Id. § 314A caveat. As the ALI
explains:
This Section states exceptions to the general rule, stated in § 314, that the
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With respect to omission and nonfeasance, the Restatement
imparts only this message: omission amounts to negligence on
the part of one who has a duty to act and one has a duty to act
under certain circumstances. As to what those circumstances
might have in common, and as to what then the "rule of duty"
truly might be, the Restatement is silent.
Half a millennium of historical inquiry makes this much clear:
for courts and commentators alike, a quest for the meaning of
nonfeasance and misfeasance and their significance to liability is,
and always has been, an inquiry after the meaning of duty. The
law might henceforth avoid the trouble these words produce and
the supposed distinction between them if only in the realm of
negligence it finds for itself a meaningful conception of duty. The
ideal formulation would harmonize and explain all of the deci-
sions whose correctness common sentiment seems to endorse, a
great many of which have already been discussed. It would ac-
count also, of course, for the long-standing and concomitant no-
tion that one has no duty to "rescue" another.
fact that the actor realizes or should realize that his action is necessary for
the aid or protection of another does not in itself impose upon him any duty
to act. The duties stated in this Section arise out of special relations between
the parties, which create a special responsibility, and take the case out of the
general rule. The relations listed are not intended to be exclusive, and are not
necessarily the only ones in which a duty of affirmative action for the aid or
protection of another may be found. There may be other such relations ...
Id. § 314A cmt. b. Yet, it offers no insight as to what makes the listed relations
"special," what they might have in common, or by what criteria courts might enlarge
their number. To some degree, ALI's special relationships reflect long-standing
common law doctrines, purporting to impose otherwise unrecognized duties of care on
those who practiced "common callings." See note 99 and accompanying text.
Modern courts have, in fact, expanded the class of "special" relationships
that warrant a duty of rescue. See, e.g., Tarasoff v. Regents of University of Califor-
nia, 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976) (citing a special relationship between an attacker and
his psychotherapist as ground for imposing a duty on the psychotherapist to warn
the decedent of the attacker's intentions to murder decedent where attacker in-
formed his psychotherapist of his intentions two months prior to the murder);
Farwell v. Keaton, 240 N.W.2d 217, 222 (Mich. 1976) (friends have a special rela-
tionship and so some duty affirmatively to protect one another when they undertake
to pass an evening together and so render themselves "companions engaged in a
common undertaking"); but see Parish v. Truman, 603 P.2d 120 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1979)
(special relationship does not exist between a host and social guests and the host
owes no duty to protect the guests from criminal attacks by third persons even
though the host knew of criminal activity in the area); Riss v. City of New York,
240 N.E.2d 860 (N.Y. 1968) (police have no duty to protect an individual citizen
even where the victim and potential assailant have both been identified and the
victim has requested protection in absence of a special relationship between the
victim and police).
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III. THE MEANING OF DUTY
To quest after a conception of duty is to search for meaningful
words that express those sentiments - those impulses to deci-
sion making that identify the obligation of care, if any, that a
person does or does not have toward those with whom one coex-
ists. Contravening most cherished wishes, the law is not to be
found in this, or in any other context, within simplistic formula-
tions drawn from "holdings"7 ' or "hornbooks," easily reproduced
in celebrated "black letters." Rather it lives in ideas that serve as
bases, not on which answers are found, but upon which judg-
ments are made. Such ideas, of course, must assume the form of
words, since words "are the machinery by which the power of
thought is handled."7 ' And although words have meaning, they
are mere adumbrations of thought and call, always, for interpre-
tation.8 0
To find a meaning for duty in negligence law is to transcend
the word with which courts have historically justified their deci-
sions, for these do not offer any genuine insight into the underly-
ing values of right and wrong at work.'8 ' The "real" rule, the
law that really governs in this realm, lies beneath the words with
178. "A decision of a case is no more law than the light from last night's
lamp is electricity." Leon Green, The Duty Problem In Negligence Cases, 28 COLUM.
L. REV. 1014, 1015 (1928).
179. Green, cited at note 178, at 1018.
180. See FRANCIS LIEBER, LEGAL AND POLITICAL HERMENEUTICS (1970). Lieber
notes:
Were we desirous ... of avoiding every possible doubt, as to what we say,
even in the most common concerns of our daily life, even if we pronounce so
simple a sentence as 'give me some bread,' endless explanations and spec-
ifications would be necessary; but in far the greater number of cases, the
difficulties would only increase, since one specification would require another.
To be brief, the very nature and essence of human language, being ... not a
direct communion of minds, but a communion by intermediate signs only, ren-
ders a total exclusion of every imaginable misapprehension, in most cases,
absolutely impossible.
Id. at 27.
181. See Green, cited at note 178, at 1021-22. Green explains:
When we say in a particular case that plaintiff had a right, defendant was
under a duty, and the like, this but means that we have already passed judg-
ment. We are merely using these terms to pronounce the judgment passed.
The process has been concluded in some unknown way; the result is merely
being vocalized. We play around with our legal technic, make use of our ro-
bust phrases, as though they disclosed the secret of our judgment. But it is a
rare thing that an opinion acknowledges the forces which must have impelled
the judgment pronounced .... But I am quite sure that as lawyers we con-
stantly delude ourselves and likewise delude others by insisting that those
delightful word jousts we call opinions are dependable guides to the workings
of the judicial processes.
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which most judges have sought to confirm their instincts and
distract their readers. It is a sense of balanced impulses born of
human nature and nurture alike. To state it is to express, in
comprehensible words, some set of factors that lead those who
"pronounce" the law, more or less, to say that a given defendant
did or did not have a duty to a given plaintiff. And that effort, if
successfully pursued, solves the puzzle of nonfeasance, misfea-
sance, act, and omission. As Green writes:
So far as I have been able to discover, the common law courts have stum-
bled through the whole period of their existence without committing
themselves on this inquiry. Perhaps it is a subject which is not to be
talked about. We are clearly dealing with the very processes by which
law is generated. And doubtless the questions as to the paternity of [du-
ty] brought forth in case after case is embarrassing enough at best."'
Green himself undertook to find the meaning of "duty" in negli-
gence law." He, like others, relies first on the distinction be-
tween action and inaction, writing that:
The most definite boundary of negligence law is the line between affirma-
tive and negative conduct. Broadly speaking no person is under a duty to
another unless he has entered upon some course of conduct towards such
other. As long as a person does nothing he comes under no duty imposed
by law."
He, like others, acknowledges that "the line of affirmative con-
duct has not always been easy to draw,"'85 and puts forth a case
similar to those discussed above:
Take for instance the case in which defendant runs into plaintiff with an
automobile or train and seriously hurts him without the violation of any
duty to plaintiff. Does defendant then owe plaintiff a duty to stop and
render assistance? Courts have held not. But it ought to be clear that a
defendant in such a case is not in the position of one who had merely
done nothing as in the case of a defendant who stands by and sees a
baby run over or a blind man walk off a cliff when defendant could res-
cue either without danger to himself. On the contrary, the defendant has
affirmatively hurt the plaintiff and in so far as affirmative conduct is
concerned, defendant is well inside the lines. He may well not have vio-
lated any duty to plaintiff in hurting him, but the fact remains that he
did hurt plaintiff. Now the question is entirely different. Having hurt
plaintiff should the law impose a duty upon defendant to take further
steps to render aid to his victim? Why should it? Why should it not? The
182. Id. at 1024.
183. See Green, cited ht note 178; Leon Green, The Duty Problem In Negligence
Cases: 11, 29 COLUM. L. REV. 255 (1929).
184. Green, cited at note 178, at 1026-27.
185. Id. at 1027.
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assumptions made by the courts generally preclude this most important
question."
Although seldom set forth in so many words, it should be self-
evident that injury cannot occur except through some risk -
some situation to which there attaches a danger, whether large
or small. A set of circumstances through which injury might arise
creates a risk and is, of necessity, a prerequisite to the events
that generate a negligence suit. One can be negligent only with
respect to some risk."'7
When the doctrines of (1) trespass on the case in assumpsit, (2)
assumpsit per se, and (3) modern negligence law, refer to mere
"nonfeasance" and today to the concomitant absence, generally, of
a duty imposed on one to aid or to rescue another, they seem
always to have been reaching for this proposition: One is duty
bound to behave prudently only with respect to such risks as are
attributable to him. They have been asking, sub silento, this
simple question: Absent the defendant's existence as a person
(or entity), would the plaintiff have nonetheless suffered the
damage of which he complains? If the answer is yes, (although
this question can only be asked unconsciously) then the risk
through which the plaintiff was damaged cannot be attributable
to the defendant and the defendant is a nonfeasor only. In such
cases, the damage may well be caused by the defendant's behav-
ior - his failure to act - which proposition is easily established
by reference to a second question: Absent the defendant's failure
to act, would the plaintiff have nonetheless suffered the damage
of which he complains? The answer to that question might easily
be "no" - which means that the defendant's failure to act has
caused the damage at issue - even as the answer to the ques-
tion previously asked is yes.
That is so, for example, of the hypothetical case described
earlier" in which the driver declines to brake for the child
while an onlooker continues to rock in her chair. With reference
to the onlooker:
(1) Absent her existence would the child nonetheless
be hurt? The answer is yes; the driver would none-
theless have been pursuing his course and struck
the child. The risk through which the child was in-
186. Id. (alteration in original).
187. The characterization of the risk through which injury occurs and its re-
lationship to negligence liability poses one of the more vexing questions to which the
common law is heir. See generally KEETON, cited at note 93; Seavey, cited at note
147; Williams, cited at note 171.
188. See notes 160-61 and accompanying text.
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jured, then, cannot be attributed to her.
(2) Absent her failure to act, would the child nonethe-
less have been hurt? The answer is no; she could
have saved him - her omission caused his injury.
It seems, however, that because the answer to the
first question is no, the law regards this onlooker
as a mere nonfeasor.
As to the matter at issue, that principle explains almost every
pertinent case on record from the fourteenth through the twenti-
eth centuries. The carpenter who had promised to build, presum-
ably for consideration, but failed to do so, was said to be a mere
nonfeasor and so liable for no damage.'89 The reason is that ab-
sent his existence - had he never been born - the plaintiffs
position would be unaltered. The debates among England's me-
dieval legal lords, including those at Gray's Inn," may have
amounted only to that.
The scenarios set forth in the Restatement are similarly ex-
plained. The AlI speaks of a defendant's failure to prevent a
blind man from stepping in front of a moving automobile and
proclaims that he shall not be liable. 9' It speaks also of one
who falls in the path of a moving train. 92 A stranger to the
railroad who witnesses the scene and might easily act to save the
victim by warning the engineer creates no liability for her
omission. 9 ' The reason is that absent the stranger's existence,
the victim's plight would have been unaltered.
One has no duty then to modify that which, absent one's pres-
ence on this earth, would nonetheless have been obtained. And
that simple principle has been hiding for six hundred years with-
in the word nonfeasance. What then of the cases in which the
answer to the question posed is "yes?" What if it be so that ab-
sent the defendant's existence the risk through which plaintiff
was damaged would not have arisen? In that case, the defendant
has a duty not to be negligent with respect to the risk at issue.
Where one person's existence creates a risk that impinges on
another, one is duty-bound to refrain from such acts or omissions,
that with respect to such risks, are negligent. The principle may
well explain the distinction between MacPherson v. Buick Motor
189. See notes 9-21 and accompanying text.
190. See notes 37 and 57 and accompanying text.
191. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314 cmt. c, illus. 1; see. also note
173 and accompanying text.
192. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314 cmt. d, illus. 3; see also note
174 and accompanying text.
193. See notes 172 and 174 and accompanying text.
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Co., 194 on one hand, and R.H. Moch v. Rensselaer Water Co.,
195
on the other.
As earlier noted, the defendant in Moch had breached its con-
tractual obligation to supply water to a municipality, and its
omission thus prevented plaintiff from extinguishing a fire that
destroyed his building.9 In MacPherson, the defendant had
failed to inspect an automobile wheel it manufactured, which
malfunctioned and caused injury to the plaintiff.'97  In
MacPherson, Cardozo ruled that the defendant owed the plaintiff
a duty not to be negligent. "' In Moch, he held that the defen-
dant had no such duty.'99 Justifying the distinction, Cardozo
wrote that the "query always is whether the putative wrongdoer
has advanced to such a point as to have launched a force or in-
strument of harm, or has stopped where inaction is at most a,
refusal to become an instrument for good."2"°
His query might better serve the cause of jurisprudence if thus
rephrased: Absent the defendant's existence would the plain-
tiffs plight have been altered? Is it not clear that the cases are
better, more precisely, and more correctly explained by reference
to just that question? Had the defendant water company never
existed - had there been no water promised to the city - plain-
tiffs building would have burned just the same.20" ' Yet, had the
Buick Motor Company never existed, plaintiff, in that case, would
not have suffered his injury. Liability in MacPherson, therefore,
arose because: (1) absent the defendant's existence the risk
through which the plaintiff was injured would not have arisen,
which fact creates a duty to refrain from negligence, and (2) the
defendant's omission to inspect was negligent by prevailing
standards." 2
The Restatement's Section 314 is similarly explained. As
earlier noted, it provides that a first person must act affirmative-
194. 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916).
195. 159 N.E. 896 (N.Y. 1928).
196. Moch, 159 N.E. at 896.
197. MacPherson, 111 N.E. at 1051.
198. Id. at 1053.
199. Moch, 159 N.E. at 896.
200. Id. at 898.
201. There is, of course, the possibility that the municipality would have con-
tracted with some other water company which might have performed better in an
emergency. That possibility goes to the question of detrimental reliance on defen-
dant's performance and suggests that absent the defendant's existence, plaintiff
might indeed have fared better in the fire. If in Moch, plaintiff had argued before
Cardozo that the defendant had indeed "launched an instrument of harm" by un-
dertaking to supply water and therefore precluding others from doing so, he might
have well prevailed.
202. See note 93 and accompanying text.
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ly to aid a second if the danger threatening the second is "due
to ... [a] force ... which is under the actor's control .... [H]is
failure to control it is treated as though he were actively direct-
ing it and not as a breach of duty to take affirmative steps to
prevent its continuance."2 3 That provision, it appears, was de-
signed to avoid any repetition of the decision in Turbeville v.
Mobile L. & R. Co.,2"4 in which the plaintiff's intestate,
through his own negligence, fell in front of defendant's streetcar
and might have been helped had the motorman then acted to
move the car backward." 5 The ALI, in its way, seems to ask
that such a motorman in the future be held liable for his failure
to act. It proclaims that his omission is to be "treated as though
he were act[ing]. "  As in MacPherson, the true and proper ex-
planation is first, that absent the trolley company's existence,
the risk that led to plaintiff's predicament would not have aris-
en, and so defendant came under a duty not to be negligent to-
ward plaintiff with respect to that risk, and second, of course,
that the motorman's omission was negligent by all prevailing
standards. 7
CONCLUSION
A historical inquiry into the jurisprudence of nonfeasance,
misfeasance, the persistence of those words in the twentieth
century, and the perplexities they produce for a common law that
attaches liability to negligent acts and omissions reveals first,
that the underlying problem is in identifying those circumstances
in which one citizen has a duty not to behave negligently toward
another, and second, that such a duty, although not necessarily
negligent, arises if, and only if, it may be said that absent the
defendant's existence, the risk through which plaintiff was in-
jured would not have arisen.
Resorting somewhat haphazardly to the word nonfeasance,
courts and commentators alike have all the while been invoking
this principle: Action and omission may both be negligent, but
one has a duty to refrain from negligence only as to those risks
created by one's existence on earth. It is time, now, for the com-
203. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314 cmt. d.
204. 127 So. 519 (Ala. 1930). See note 97 and accompanying text (discussing
the import of Turbeville). The illustration that the ALl provides, however, is differ-
ent but analogous. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314 cmt. d, illus. 3; see
also note 174.
205. Turbeville, 127 So. at 520-521.
206. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314 cmt. d.
207. See note 93 and accompanying text.
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mon law to replace its use of "nonfeasance" with that proposition
- a proper and more precise reflection of the principles its expos-
itors have all the while sought to vindicate.

